1954:
As the year began, Nash President George Mason was disappointed at losing Hudson to Packard, but it was not a major concern. What was a major concern was the rumor mill had both Pontiac and Plymouth introducing overhead valve V8s for ’55, putting the Ambassador and Statesman even farther off the pace with their old inline sixes.
Packard had a V8 under development, and Mason (above) had had discussions with Packard President James Nance about buying them for the Nash Ambassador. The Packard engine would put the Ambassador back in competition, if there were no problems in development and if it was ready for production on schedule. The price Packard was talking about was another matter. To make matters worse, Packard insisted on providing the V8 only with its own Ultramatic transmission, a complex and expensive piece. Due to its size and cost, the Packard engine would be no help for the smaller Nash Statesman, which was suffering from being underpowered even more than the Ambassador.
Searching for an alternative, Mason turned to the Studebaker V8. The Studebaker had been in production since 1951 and had earned a reputation for ruggedness, but its displacement, only 232 cubic inches, was even smaller than the existing Ambassador 6. With few alternatives, two mechanics from the engine lab were sent out to local Detroit junkyards looking for a few 232s for Engineering to look over. Examination of the engines revealed there was some room to both bore and stroke the engines, to a maximum displacement of 289 cubic inches. Their estimate of the 289’s output with a high compression ratio and 4 barrel carburetor was slightly over 200hp, on par with the 320 that Packard was offering.
Mason wrote a letter to Harold Vance expressing interest in buying Studebaker engines, modified along the lines the Nash engineers sketched out. With the Chevrolet/Ford price war devastating Studebaker sales, Vance was open to the extra business that Nash could provide. A meeting was arranged in South Bend, with Romney leading the delegation of Nash engineers as they met with Gene Hardig’s team, who developed the V8, to explore the feasibility of the modifications. Hardig’s team did not let on at the time, but they had been considering enlarging the engine themselves, and took the Nash engineer’s suggestions as confirmation of their own thinking.
Very little time elapsed before there were prototype 289s running in the Studebaker Engineering Building and streaking around the Studebaker proving grounds in test mules. The rapid work was much a factor of the simplicity of the modifications as it was the growing desperation for new business in South Bend as the flow of red ink became a torrent.
Mason’s concern grew as Studebaker’s rapidly deteriorating condition jeopardized the entire V8 program. If Studebaker went bankrupt, the tooling for the V8 could be tied up in court far beyond when Nash needed to have the engines in production. How could access to the V8 be secured and the engine produced without delay? After discussions with Romney far into the night, Mason picked up the phone and called Vance, “would you consider a merger of our two firms?”
The proposal Mason laid out in that conversation was a consolidation of operations: body building and final assembly would be consolidated in Nash facilities, while foundry and engine production would be consolidated in South Bend. Studebaker production in South Bend would end as soon as possible to stem the bleeding, surplus buildings and equipment sold off. Studebaker dealers would be selling retrimmed senior Nashes as Studebakers, plus the compact Rambler. Nash dealers would be offered the Studebaker truck line. But would the union agree?
Vance and Paul Hoffman called an all hands meeting in the Notre Dame football stadium that August to lay out the situation. While the merger would result in some 60% of Studebaker workers losing their jobs, without the merger, Studebaker would surely fail and everyone would lose their jobs. Additionally, for the merger to work, the Studebaker workers needed to agree to work under the provisions of the Nash contract. Since the end of WWII, Vance and Hoffman had been too willing to buy labor peace with increases in pay and low productivity that had reached uncompetitive levels. The Nash workers had a good contract and lived comfortably, but it was a big pay cut for those in South Bend. Paul Hoffman in particular had a good relationship with the union and Harold Churchill, the person designated to be the President of the South Bend division post-merger was respected by everyone, so the workers were willing to listen to what they had to say. The President of Local 5 worked tirelessly to persuade the rank and file to accept the Nash contract. The workers voted to accept the Nash contract, but registered their distaste for it by voting in a new President of Local 5 at the next election.
With the green light from the Boards of both companies and the UAW, the merger closed on October 1st. One week later, George Mason died. Mason had delegated much of the detail work to Romney, so the work of the merger continued unabated.
One of Mason’s last decisions was to introduce a curved windshield on the ’55 senior Nashes. The decision was made so late that production of the ’55 models was delayed until January. As it happened, this worked out perfectly as it provided time after the closure of the merger for work to be completed adapting the Nash engine compartment to take the Studebaker V8s, the 289/4bbl combination in the Ambassador, and the bored block with the original 232 crankshaft, creating a 259 with a 2 barrel carburetor providing desperately needed power for the Statesman. Nash used the same Borg Warner manual transmission as Studebaker, so the bell housing was an off the shelf Studebaker part. The three months provided time to produce the tooling for a bell housing to mate the V8 to the Hydramatic transmission that Nash had been using for several years. The ’55 Nash used a new front clip. Again, that three month delay provided time to reroute the new stamping dies from Nash’s usual vendor to the Studebaker stamping plant in South Bend.
The pieces were falling into place, but could Romney turn the company around in time?
1955
1955 opened with the most turmoil Nash had ever experienced. Romney worked far into the night with the heads of Kenosha Assembly, Milwaukee Body and South Bend. The pieces had to fall into place on time and in the right sequence for the merger to work.
The first ’55 Nash came off the line on January 6th, an Ambassador with a 289 and Hydramatic. It was already sold. Coon Brothers in metro Detroit had full payment, in cash, in hand. The Studebaker V8 line, installed only 5 years earlier, was state of the art with machining done in a single automated line 300 feet long. Productivity of the V8 line was so much higher than the old Ambassador six line, which dated from the mid ’30s, that the V8 could be offered at only a $90 premium to the six. The take rate for the V8 shot to over 70% immediately for both the Ambassador and Statesman. By March, Romney decided to drop the sixes and make the V8 standard in both of the senior models.
In South Bend, due to the surge in demand from Kenosha and soaring truck sales in their first year of the V8 being available, along with modest recovery of Studebaker sales with the end of the GM/Ford price war, a second shift was needed on the V8 line.
The plan had always been for the Rambler to replace the Champion, so the end of the Champion six line was already in sight. Harold Churchill called Romney and explained that the V8 line was running at full capacity for one shift and needed another shift, but “Church” did not want to hire new people for the second shift, when the Champion six workers would be laid off in a few months. Romney agreed to start shipping Ramblers to Studebaker dealers immediately, thus eliminating the need for building Champions, and Champion sixes, releasing the Champion six line workers to man the second shift on the V8 line.
When the AMC artwork people complained about needing more time to prepare Studebaker Rambler sales materials, Romney asked, “why prepare Studebaker Rambler materials at all?” He continued “let’s remove the Nash branding that is on the literature and cars now and sell them simply as Ramblers, through both Nash and Studebaker dealers.”, and thus Rambler was born as a stand alone brand from the urgency of the situation.
The deed was done in a week. The Champion six line was idled and the last Studebaker Champion rolled off the South Bend line a week later. Lacking the Champion six, the elderly Commander six became the base engine for the truck line for the balance of the year.
In May, the dies for the Studebaker versions of the Nash models, cars which wags soon named the “Stash” arrived in South Bend for installation in the presses, and Studebaker passenger car production came to an end.
While the South Bend body and assembly buildings fell silent, the engine plant hummed with activity. Nash had been planning to introduce an OHV version of the 196 in the fall of ’55 as the base engine in the completely redesigned ’56 Rambler. The OHV 196 was nearly a new engine, sharing only crank and rods and a few machining operations with the old flathead. Churchill suggested the idle Champion six line be retooled for the 196. Little extra work would be required compared to converting the 196 line in Kenosha and, as the South Bend line was idle, the conversion could be done without disrupting 196 production on the Kenosha line. Romney gave the go ahead and retooling began.
On November, 1st OHV 196 production began in South Bend to begin building stock in Kenosha for the start of production of the ’56 Rambler. Production at Kenosha engine ended three weeks later. On December 15th, the first ’56 Rambler rolled off the Kenosha line, powered by a South Bend built 196.
As the holidays arrived at the end of 1955, silent buildings were everywhere in American Motors. The Kenosha foundry and engine plant were idle as were the South Bend body, assembly and trim plants.
Thousands had been laid off in Kenosha and South Bend. But next to those ghostly relics, lights blazed in the departments that had survived the consolidation as they produced in volumes they had not seen since the end of the post war seller’s market. More importantly, the flood of red ink was ebbing.
1956
Senator Joe McCarthy’s influence was on the wane by the beginning of 1956, but Romney needed his help.
During the war, Nash had built Pratt & Whitney aircraft engines. As part of this engine program, engine test cells had been built on the grounds of the Kenosha plant. Designed to withstand an exploding engine, the test cells resembled huge chimneys 40 feet tall, built of foot thick poured concrete. Removing them to clear the space for auto production would be an expensive undertaking, and there were over 30 test cells.
Romney wrote a letter to Senator McCarthy asking if there was something he could do to help with the cost of removing the cells so AMC could expand. Senator McCarthy offered an amendment to a Defense Department appropriation bill entirely funding the removal of the test cells. No one was willing to take on “Tailgunner Joe” on such a minor issue, and the amendment was approved. Demolition was scheduled over AMC’s summer shutdown, when 30th Ave along the east side of the plant, where the cells were, could be closed. Romney’s facilities program was on its way.
All of the iron casting work had been moved to Studebaker’s excellent foundry in South Bend, so all the equipment was removed from the Kenosha foundry and scrapped. New car repair and shipping was moved from Building 35 into the old foundry building. Building 35 and the finishing department wing that extended north along 30th Ave from the foundry were torn down.
In South Bend, buildings dating from Studebaker’s horse and wagon days were torn down, clearing the area north of Sample St for employee parking, so the other lots in the area Studebaker had bought for parking could be sold.
The truck body line was moved to the modern plant on Chippewa Ave on the south side of the city. The two car body lines were disassembled and placed on the conveyor to the old assembly building, where they were stored. Offices were set up in the engineering building and the old Administration building vacated. By the end of the year, half of the former Studebaker complex in downtown South Bend would be disposed of, leaving the area south of Sample St, where the foundry, engine plant, stamping plant, offices, engineering and shipping dock were all concentrated.
Everything was ready for the new construction to start in 1957, except for the financing. Romney had an appointment with a group of insurance companies to make his case for a loan, but the outcome was not a sure thing as these same insurance companies had just turned Packard down.
Packard President James Nance had outbid Mason for Hudson. Mason had looked at Hudson as a dealership grab, as he had no interest in the Hudson products or facilities. When Nance had taken over as President of Packard, he had developed two strategic objectives: establish a stand alone mid-market brand and bring body building in house. Hudson met both of those objectives as it was an established mid-market brand and owned a body plant, and Nance was determined to win a bidding war no matter what the cost.
Everything seemed to go well at first. The Packard body dies were moved to the Hudson plant on Conner Ave. The bodies then were trucked to E. Grand using the body trucks Hudson already owned. The 1955 Hudsons were retrimmed short wheelbase Packards using the old Hudson 308 and a small displacement version of the new Packard V8.
The roof started to cave in when it became apparent Packard had rushed its new V8 and Twin Ultramatic, and Torsion-Level suspension into production with nearly no testing. Warranty claims expense was stratospheric and the cars quickly gained a bad reputation. Engineering eventually solved the transmission and suspension problems, but never successfully corrected the engine’s oil feed problems. Then Packard introduced an electric gear selector system, in place of a mechanical linkage, again, untested, and another crop of marooned Packard owners was born when they could not shift the transmission out of Park. The press hung the “troubled” label on Packard and customers stayed away. When Nance asked for a loan to develop an all new car, the insurance companies looked at the falling sales and operating losses and said “no”.
Against that backdrop, Romney’s position was only slightly better. He had spent heavily on the reorganization after the merger, plus developing the OHV 196, and the all new ’56 Rambler. The ’56 Rambler had originally been intended as a ’57 model, but it was pushed out a year early and suffered severe quality and reliability problems.
Fortunately, the senior Nashes and Studebakers were a different story: a well developed platform, with a well developed engine, which provided the Nash customers with the horsepower they had wanted and provided Studebaker customers with the wider, roomier interior that they had wanted, and they provided a stabilizing influence on the company. Romney was able to convince the lenders that their improving financial picture would be improved further with the new construction he wanted to finance and the loan package was granted.
1957
1957 was a time of birth, and death, at American Motors.
With the financing arranged, and a large area of cleared space on the west side of the Kenosha complex, construction started on extending building 44 into a new body plant.
Since its founding, Nash had been trucking bodies from a subcontractor in Milwaukee, Seaman Body Corporation. Nash eventually bought Seaman outright, but continued to truck bodies the 40 miles to Kenosha as the return on investment never seemed to work to build a new body plant in Kenosha.
Unibody construction, which AMC used, has the downside of giving the cars a complex structure which provides many areas were moisture and dirt can be trapped and start rust. To provide better rust protection, AMC body engineers had developed a process of dipping the entire assembled body in primer, rather than spraying primer on as had been done in the past. Dipping could get primer into areas that spray would not reach and ensure a uniform thickness of primer. Modifying the existing body lines in Milwaukee to incorporate the dipping process would require a significant investment.
When comparing the cost of modifying the Milwaukee body lines to accommodate the dipping process, versus building a new body plant in Kenosha, with the dipping process designed in, and saving the extra cost of shipping assembled bodies from Milwaukee, the numbers started to work in Kenosha’s favor. In a meeting of the senior management in Detroit where the option of a Kenosha body plant was discussed, Harold Churchill reminded Romney that all the equipment from the Studebaker body plant was sitting in storage in South Bend. The equipment could be shipped to Kenosha and installed at lower cost than buying new, then body production could be shifted from Milwaukee with minimal disruption in flow to the assembly plant. That sealed the decision, The orders were given to demolish old buildings in Kenosha to clear the needed space as plant engineering inventoried the Studebaker equipment and began designing the new body lines as plans were drawn for the new body plant to come on line for the ’58 model year.
As the steel for the new body plant rose, Romney faced another decision. The senior Nash platform had not been updated since 1952. The skirted front wheels, a favorite of George Mason, had been eliminated, but the body was showing its age. An all new body would require a major investment of AMC’s already stretched finances. Additionally, a horsepower race was under way. Midmarket models that the Ambassador competed with were moving to engines well beyond 300 cubic inch displacement. The old Studebaker V8, as strong and as durable as it was, could not grow beyond the 289 already in production. The McCulloch supercharger could provide the additional power, and the V8 could easily take the pressure, but Kaiser’s experience with that supercharger had shown it to be very troublesome in daily use. A new senior platform, would require an all new engine to power it.
Romney’s inclination had been to focus on small cars as the big three did not compete in that segment. The high cost of developing both a new senior platform and a new larger engine, sealed the senior’s fate. The decision was made to produce a stretched version of the ’58 Rambler, itself receiving it first restyling, as the new Ambassador. This route had the advantages of much lower cost than an entirely new model, and a stretched Rambler would still be within the 289’s ability to provide competitive performance. With the ’58 line entirely based on the Rambler, the decision was made to market them exclusively under the Rambler name. When the last ’57s rolled off the line in Kenosha, the names Studebaker and Nash passed into history.
Related CC Reading:
Packard + Chrysler: Ask The Man Who Owns the 100-Million-Dollar Look
Curbside Classic: 1964 Studebaker Challenger – This Challenger Never Had a Chance
Car Show Classic: 1964 Studebaker Daytona Convertible – Studebaker’s Last Gasp Of Fresh Air
Perfectly constructed alt-history! As I read it, I started to think “Hey! I’m thoroughly familiar with the story of the merger, but I never read this part of the process!”
That’s the mark of excellent alt-history!
Nash + Studie would have been a better marriage in terms of complementary skills. Nash needed V8s and automatics, and Studie needed competent management and quality production. Hudson didn’t contribute anything but the dealers, which Nash could have gained anyway after Hudson failes.
Persuaseive case. One question: Why would they use the Hydramatic instead of the Borg Warner DG developed for the Stude V8?
Why would they use the Hydramatic instead of the Borg Warner DG developed for the Stude V8?
Nash had been using the Hydramatic for some years. It was already worked in to the torque tube drive that Nash used.
Please correct me if I am wrong but didn’t Nash and Hudson merge, while Studebaker and Packard combined as part of Mason’s failed plan to combine all four?
Yes. This is an alternate reality “What If”.
Thanks for a well-done alternate reality thought experiment. There’s a lot here that makes sense and works, although I do have a few niggling issues about some of the details.
FWIW, the Studebaker V8 was about 50lbs heavier than the (real) AMC V8, which was also quite heavy. All Ramblers with the V8 (like the Studebakers) were nose heavy, as these “big block/small displacement” V8s were just too heavy for these relatively light cars. The extra 50 lbs would have exacerbated the problem a bit further, but admittedly not by a huge amount.
I have a bigger problem with your plans for the AMC six:
The OHV 196 was nearly a new engine, sharing only crank and rods and a few machining operations with the old flathead. Churchill suggested the idle Champion six line be retooled for the 196. Little extra work would be required compared to converting the 196 line in Kenosha and, as the South Bend line was idle, the conversion could be done without disrupting 196 production on the Kenosha line.
It is the machining operations on the blocks (transfer lines) that are huge, complex, very expensive to change, and difficult to move, as these transfer line machines are all set up for a specific bore spacing. That’s why the bore spacing is typically not changed, even with a new generation of engines, such as AMC’s gen1 and gen2 V8s. Totally different engines; but same bore spacing in order to keep using the same massive machines to machine the block.
So there’s no way that South bend could start producing the 196 without either the Nash 196 transfer lines being moved (with massive effort) to South Bend, but why do that? In order for South bend to start producing the 196 (while Kenosha also produced it) that would require a massive investment in new transfer line equipment of the sort these companies would never contemplate and would make no sense.
BTW, Romney didn’t “spend heavily” on the ohv 196; it was a classic ohv conversion of the flathead 196, which of course allowed them to keep all of those very expensive transfer lines for machining the blocks. It was done on the cheap. What was expensive was Romney (actually) building their own V8, which required new transfer lines (used for decades until the last AMC V8 was built).
Then there’s this:
Harold Churchill reminded Romney that all the equipment from the Studebaker body plant was sitting in storage in South Bend. The equipment could be shipped to Kenosha and installed at lower cost than buying new, then body production could be shifted from Milwaukee with minimal disruption in flow to the assembly plant.
I’m struggling to see how Studebaker’s BOF body building equipment would be of any/much use to build the unibody Ramblers. There’s considerable differences, but maybe some? I rather suspect Studebaker’s body building equipment was rather old.
So the end result is that Kenosha built all the cars (Ramblers) and Studebaker built the engines, right? But then there’s this line:
In May, the dies for the Studebaker versions of the Nash models, cars which wags soon named the “Stash” arrived in South Bend for installation in the presses, and Studebaker passenger car production came to an end.
I’m not understanding this. Are these the large cars? You’re suggesting that Studebaker could suddenly switch to building unibody cars? That would be quite the trick. So for how long were these “Stashes” built in SB? I’m a bit confused by this.
Enough nit-picking, as I realize it is just a thought experiment. But in the big picture, I’m struggling to see what AMC got out of this merger. Seems to me little or nothing, as without the merger they ended up with their own (slightly lighter and more modern) V8 engine. Well, there’s the dealer network, but then Nash got that from Hudson too. Seems more like a wash either way.
Paul, all valid questions.
First, moving 196 production. What could be retained from the Champion 6 line: all of the material handling equipment.
This drawing shows the flathead and OHV versions of the 196. The block looks to be different, thus new casting patterns and coreboxes are needed. The head is entirely new, so a new machining line is needed for that. I wrote this in 2016, so memory is hazy on some things that I knew when I wrote it. Both the Champion and Nash sixes dated from the end of the 30s, so they may not have had the elaborate, automated, machining lines that were the norm after the war.
There is not that much difference in building a body for a BOF vehicle vs unibody, until final assembly. The equipment involved is primarily conveyor systems, as well as wending and painting. Much of the Studebaker equipment was new-ish. The Board would not give Vance the money for a new plant, but they did spend millions on new equipment.
No Nashes would be final assembled, or the bodies built, in South Bend. South Bend had significant stamping capacity. Stamping capacity was expanded after the war, by purchase of presses from government war surplus stockpiles. This additional capacity would allow stamping work that Nash had been outsourcing to vendors to be brought in house. The stampings would be shipped to Milwauikee for assembly.
What would Nash get out of it, besides a modern. proven, V8? A way to move casting and engine production out of the main plant in Kenosha. to free up footprint for the body plant.
In this view. looking to the northeast, you can see the railroad tracks that bisected the plant complex. The foundry, which would be replaced by the SB foundry, is in the lower left, with the associated finishing department. North of the foundry complex is building 35. The newer looking building at the northwest corner of the complex is building 44, built during the war for aircraft engine assembly, with the test cells next to it. Moving casting and engine production to SB, would free up enough footprint to expand 44 into a complete body and paint plant, to replace the Milwaukee body plant,
Thanks for the clarifications.
What would they call the merged company if it came to fruition-Stunash?
They would probably go with American Motors, as it was Mason and then Romney, at the helm.
On the street, it would surely be called Nudebaker.
From what (little) I understand about the Ford vs. Chevrolet pricing battle of the period, it’s kind of amazing that *anything* remained of the “Independent 4” after the price wars achieved a sort of truce. Would combining all of the 4 independent companies into one have made for a better, stronger AMC? I can’t see how.
Nice job, Steve! I loved the way you combined creativity and knowledge to weave a storyline that rolled along in an almost day-to-day fashion, with the leaders having a high-level vision but dealing with events as they arose. The strategy had a good feel, the two companies able to actually benefit from product synergies, unlike Studebaker-Packard.
Must admit, was a bit surprised by your ending, in my mind thinking that Nash and Studebaker were going to continue selling cars under those names. I found myself wanting a re-write the way Elvis’ “Wild in the Country” had to do because the screening audience didn’t like what originally happened to Hope Lange.
I think Paul N.s issues would have needed to be comprehended and resolved, and I wondered why Studebaker’s Six couldn’t be converted to OHVs as it eventually was.
The Packard-Hudson merger probably deserves as much creativity and knowledge. For example, am skeptical that Packard’s dies could have simply been trucked over to Hudson and, with a little elbow grease, Contours would be rolling again. Leaving the technical upheaval of crashing Monobilt’s party aside, the Contours needed to be replaced, not relocated. Both companies could have continued production of their ‘54s while Nance and Barit lobbied investors in early ’54 to fund all-new bodies for ’55. Packard had a winning design with its Panther concept but needed step-down to enable a comfortable seat height.
the two companies able to actually benefit from product synergies, unlike Studebaker-Packard.
There is an alt history of the Studebaker-Packard merger. I never wrote it up. The key is doing the merger one year sooner. Merge one year sooner, and the Packard foundry work goes to the Studebaker foundry, rather than outsourced to Lakey in Muskegon. Merge one year sooner, and the new V8 line is installed in South Bend, rather than Utica. Merge one year sooner, and the Ultramatic and rear axle lines are moved to South Bend, rather than Utica. Merge one year sooner, and the final assembly line from East Grand is moved to the South Bend Chippewa plant, rather than the Conner body plant. But no. Nance sank millions into doubling down on being in metro Detroit, so the merger was synergy-free.
Pic: the Packard final assembly line at E Grand, being pulled up immediately after the last 54 goes down the line, to be transplanted at Conner.
I think Paul N.s issues would have needed to be comprehended and resolved, and I wondered why Studebaker’s Six couldn’t be converted to OHVs as it eventually was.
The toughest nut is getting 196 production moved to South Bend, on a tight schedule. I see three degrees of freedom in making that happen: 1-Automakers routinely have a two week shutdown in the summer, and another around Christmas. The engine line move can be coordinated with that shutdown. 2-the engine line in Kenosha can be run to build up an inventory of 196 flatties to allow car assembly to continue for some time after the engine line is shut down. 3-how much OT is management willing to pay the millwrights to make it happen on a tight schedule?
The 196 was spawned from the 172 that was created for the Nash 600 in, iirc, 41. Like the Champion 6 that came out in 39, it was a small, undersquare, 4 bearing 6. The OHV conversion of the 196 has the virtue of already being in the works. Studebaker was still thinking about an F-head conversion, but, as we know, would not actually do anything until the early 60s.
After WWII, engine block machining lines were 300 foot long, integrated, highly automated assemblies. They could still be broken down and moved. Jeep bought the Buick V6 line in the 60s, and moved it to Toledo. Then Buick bought the line back from AMC in the 70s, broke the line down, and moved it back to a Buick engine plant. British Leyland bought the Buick aluminum V8, broke the line down, and moved it to the UK.
In the case of both the 196 and Champion 6, we are talking about pre-war production technology. I dug out the source material I used to create the alt history. The information about the Nash line talks about it being 550 feet long, but then talks about individual machines along the line. The Studebaker line description is explicit, with photos: each machine operates automatically, but the machines are separate, each with it’s own operator. The operator pulls a block off of a conveyor, pushes it in place, and starts the machine. When the machine is done, the operator pulls that block out, and shoves it down the conveyor, grabs the next block in line, and pushes that one into the machine. As the Nash line is only two years newer than the Champion 6 line, I expect it was very much the same. The conversion would consist of examining which existing Studebaker machines were economic to modify to perform their operations on the Nash block, and which would require replacement with a machine from Kenosha. The existing conveyors and final engine assembly line sould not require a great deal of modification.
Pix from a Studebaker book, showing state of the art engine production, of 1939.
The text said this machine performed rough and finish milling of the top, bottom, and ends of the blocks, two at a time.
The Natco 119 spindle drilling machine. The roller conveyor is visible on the left, that the operator shoves the block along when this machine is finished.
Boring and honing the cylinders.
For example, am skeptical that Packard’s dies could have simply been trucked over to Hudson and, with a little elbow grease,
The net seems to have eaten my reply, so let’s try again.
I was at a show at the Gilmore, several years ago, chatting with a guy who mentioned he worked in a stamping plant. I was working on this alt history at the time, so I asked him about the feasibility of taking dies that had been designed for one particular make and model of press, and putting them in a press of different make and model, but of sufficient power. He said it is commonly done. They use shims to make the dies fit in the presses.
That’s good to know, thanks.
If I could go back in time as an Adjustment Bureau agent, I’d place in Nance’s mind the idea of delaying the launch of the V8 by one year, merging with Hudson as the Senior partner in late ’53, tooling the ’55 Panther as 2HT, 2CV and 4D and build it in Jefferson as either a BoF car or better still, a Monobilt, with a Hudson version too, and then launch the V8 in ’56.
It takes money to make money, and which was more important to the buying public in ’55, a new Packard and Hudson engine or a new body? My guess is that 8 in 10 would say body.
build it in Jefferson as either a BoF car or better still, a Monobilt, with a Hudson version too, and then launch the V8 in ’56.
From what I have read, Jefferson was in terrible material condition. Barit hadn’t spent diddly on maintenance in years. Better to consolidate on E Grand.
Terrible condition or not, I’ve never heard of anything other than quality cars coming out of the Jefferson plant. And EGB was about to be cut in half by I-94, though those plans may not have been known to Packard in late 1953.
A merger with Hudson would give Packard a chance to exit body building and focus on the rest of the car, and the nice thing, though not nice for the Briggs body engineers, is that when Nance tossed Colbert the keys to Conner later on in 1954, Packard’s footprint would have immediately been downsized. Maybe what was left of EGB could have been renovated to build the new V8. The Master Engine Builder teams with a master body builder.
There was also Murray, which Nance at some point had put a tender offer on. The Jet body was built there. Maybe it could have built the big cars beginning in ’55 if Jet truly did need to go. But it would have been nice to keep Jet around, maybe focusing it more on Europe. Not sure if there was a business case though, given shipping costs, tariffs and exchange rates.
And EGB was about to be cut in half by I-94, though those plans may not have been known to Packard in late 1953.
The plans for the highway must have been known for years. It started as the Willow Run Expressway, to help get workers to the bomber plant, in 41. Then the highway was extended through Dearborn during the war.
As you said, it did cut through the E Grand complex. The worst part was it cut the railroad line that served the Packard plant, as the connecting mainline was north of the highway, the wrong side to serve the plant.
Maybe what was left of EGB could have been renovated to build the new V8. The Master Engine Builder teams with a master body builder.
I don’t know if E Grand would have had high enough overhead clearance to accommodate the V8 line. This pic is from the Packard annual report, of the V8 line in Utica.
I enjoy these ‘what if’s’ but the finance aspects always get short shift. Seems to me any plausible merger of any of the independents would need a massive injection of new capital to work. I don’t see anyone leading any of these companies hundreds of millions of dollars.
I enjoy these ‘what if’s’ but the finance aspects always get short shift. Seems to me any plausible merger of any of the independents would need a massive injection of new capital to work. I don’t see anyone leading any of these companies hundreds of millions of dollars.
Historically, the Nash/Hudson and Packard/Studebaker mergers did happen. The bit in the story about Romney getting a loan from the insurance companies that had just turned Packard down, in 56? That actually happened.
Very interesting alternate history. Romney’dream was to merge all four (Nash, Hudson, Packard, and Studebaker) together, which would have surpassed Chrysler, making us one of the big three. The 196, 199, 232, 258 block and head machining lines went into the old foundry. The test cells were still there when I was laid off in ’84. Could have been very different. Thank you for writing it.
The 196, 199, 232, 258 block and head machining lines went into the old foundry. The test cells were still there when I was laid off in ’84. Could have been very different. Thank you for writing it.
Glad you enjoyed it. I have talked with a couple other former AMC workers. At least one did mention that engine production moved into the old foundry. Occupying the foundry building, and leaving the engine test cells in place, impedes the plan to build a new body plant in that footprint. I asked one of the AMC workers, and he confirmed there were days when Kenosha assembly had to be shut down, because the weather was so bad the body trucks could not get through from Milwaukee.
It’s been said that GM’s vast dealer network was one of their primary strengths. In their heyday, there was a Chevy or Ford dealer around the corner in just about every small town across the nation.
I wonder how the dealer network of a combined ‘Independent Four’ Packard/Hudson/Studebaker/Nash merger’s dealer network expansion would have compared with that of Chrysler/Desoto/Dodge/Plymouth.
I wonder how the dealer network of a combined ‘Independent Four’ Packard/Hudson/Studebaker/Nash merger’s dealer network expansion would have compared with that of Chrysler/Desoto/Dodge/Plymouth.
It was not just the number of dealers, but the quality of the dealers.
The Rambler dealer in Kalamazoo was a dingy little place, when my mom bought her 64 Classic there. By the end of the 60s, both the Ford and Chrysler/Plymouth stores in town had built big, new, well lit, clean, stores. Art Post AMC was still in the same dingy little building.
The Hudson dealer in Ypsilanti, MI, has since been turned into a museum, so I can see what it was like. Off of the main streets, very small, room for one car in the showroom.
Here is a pic of the showroom of the preserved Hudson dealership in Ypsilanti.
Yeah, many (most?) of those independent dealerships seem like they were little more than a garage with a glass pane storefront, large enough for one or two cars, a look that harkened back to the fledgling days of the auto industry.
But it certainly wouldn’t have hurt for all of those old places to be selling a range of vehicles from a merged independent group.
Wonderful akternate history.
Wouldn’t one do an overhead valve conversion of the Champion six instead, as was done later (the Skybolt Six).
It’s too bad that Packard (and Studebaker) had such incompetent management. But they (and Hudson to a lesser extent) had suffered from bad management for years in comparison with Nash. Studebaker had already declared bankruptcy once, and Packard had all sorts of struggles going back to the 1920’s and their failed efforts in the airplane engine field, along with an inability to maintain a styling department other than Ed MacCauley’s rather incompetent efforts.
Lovely bit of fantasy but it would have failed on day one. There’s no way the workers in South Bend would have rolled over and taken a financial bath. In 1962, with the company on death row, they went out on strike for 38 days. Workers will walk rather than submit to huge cuts in wages.
There’s no way the workers in South Bend would have rolled over and taken a financial bath.
The story talks about an all hands meeting at the Notre Dame football stadium, to persuade the rank and file to take a pay cut. That did happen. As the story says, the workers approved the pay cut, but they elected a new President of local 5 at the next election.
A good point was raised.. the workers could have lived with pay cuts but not job cuts. Not voluntarily.
Got to look at what’s happening/not happening with “Boeing”, now you bring that up.
H’mm.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BW0YllnHFqI
Go to about 20 minutes into this Studebaker history made in 1983 and you will see a big Notre Dame gathering and Nance. Keep watching to hear the narrator’s unflattering take on the new ’55 Packards.
Steve, wondering if you were in this video.
Go to about 20 minutes into this Studebaker history made in 1983 and you will see a big Notre Dame gathering
The film they showed was the shindig about the merger, in October. Just before that sequence, around the 19:30 mark, the narrator talks about the workers taking a 15% pay cut. That pay cut was the subject of the meeting in the stadium a couple months earlier, which was the meeting referenced in the story.
I am not sure what is going on with Boeing. But the management (after the reverse takeover by MD) left Seattle long ago, and they have been moving jobs out of there for a long time. Management doesnt have the best reputation, either. Workers may feel that their jobs have a short shelf-life no matter what, and better to get as much as they can now. This may have been the thinking of the workers in South Bend at the same time.
In the “what might have been” vein.
What would have happened if Citroen bought Lancia instead of Maserati in 1968, and abandoned the Wankel at the same time in favor of Lancia’s advanced small engines?
What would have happened if Citroen bought Lancia instead of Maserati in 1968, and abandoned the Wankel at the same time in favor of Lancia’s advanced small engines?
My favorite is what if, when VW bought Auto Union from Daimler, the F103 was launched with a VW flat 4 in front, connected to the existing front drive powertrain, as VW did with the Gol in Brazil? Do that instead of pouring a pile into the Type 4. Then relaunch the Audi brand with the 100.
It’s a crime what they did to the F103’s front turn signals in the “Audi” conversion. From those really well-integrated fender peaks to the warts stuck on the side.
_SO_ many fascinating details ! .
Coulda, shoulda, woulda .
-Nate
This is a fascinating series of what-ifs. Next up – AMC passes on buying Kaiser Jeep because it already has a line of AMC trucks still being built in South Bend. But then they buy International’s more modern truck line when that company gets out of the light vehicle market in 1980.
The only problem with that scenario is that unless AMC came up with the dough to redesign the Studie-based trucks, their sales would’ve completely dried up by the early-60s, leaving a 5-to-10 year gap before AMC would be able to buy IH’s truck business out. (Too bad…I love the idea of an AMC-based Scout!)
Next up – AMC passes on buying Kaiser Jeep because it already has a line of AMC trucks still being built in South Bend. But then they buy International’s more modern truck line when that company gets out of the light vehicle market in 1980
The Jeep buy worked out very well for AMC. When the price of gas was high, they couldn’t give Jeeps away, but people lined up for Gremlins and Hornets. When gas was cheap, the AMC compacts went begging, but people lined up for Jeeps..
AMC would not have bought anything in the early 80s. Between the price of gas doubling, thanks to the revolution in Iran, and Fed Chairman Volker strangling the economy to kill inflation, AMC was broke. Renault was pouring money into AMC, to keep it alive, until the Alliance and the downsized Cherokee could hit the market.
Steve, I LOVE this alternate history that you’ve cooked up. But I do have two questions that you didn’t really touch on: the Studebaker truck line. You talked about doing away with the Studebaker and Nash nameplates and just going it alone with the Rambler name, as indeed happened starting in 1957. You also touched on the Nash dealers getting the Studebaker truck line to sell. In your alternate history, what would happen to the Studebaker truck line, long-term? Would they be renamed as Ramblers too, or would the trucks retain the Studebaker name, similar to today when they’re not called “Dodge” trucks anymore, but “Ram” trucks?
Also, the trucks were getting pretty long in the tooth by then, having originally been introduced as 1948 models. In your alternate history, when and how would AMC have modernized the truck line, or would they have simply continued selling the trucks until they couldn’t be marketed anymore and then just dropped? Studebaker did introduce a new cab for the truck line starting in 1960, but that was really just a derivative of their Lark sedan which had been introduced the year before. In your alternate history, there would be no Lark body, therefore no new cab for the trucks…
Would they be renamed as Ramblers too, or would the trucks retain the Studebaker name, similar to today when they’re not called “Dodge” trucks anymore, but “Ram” trucks?
You are correct. I left the trucks dangling in the air. Historically, Studebaker renamed the E Series trucks “Transtar” in 56. The Champ could not happen, due to the lack of a body on frame passenger car body to cut up to make the cab. Without the Champ, civilian truck production would probably completely dry up in the early 60s. That would leave Chippewa doing government work. Studebaker had built M35s in Chippewa. Kaiser-Jeep bought the Chippewa facilities in 64, then Chippewa became the AM General division of AMC, when AMC bought Jeep.
These post office Jeeps, officially the DJ-5, were built in the former Studebaker Plant 8, service parts warehouse, next to the Chippewa plant, by AM General.
Army M151s on the assembly line. This looks like it might be in Plant 8 as well, due to the lower roof.
Army M35 deuce and a half on the line in Chippewa.
That was a great read – it took me until about the third paragraph before I realized it was semi-fictional. The give-a-way was the ease of negotiations between Mason, Romney, Vance, and Nance – my understanding is there were a lot of egos involved in those discussions.
the ease of negotiations between Mason, Romney, Vance, and Nance
lol. Yes, things go smoother when Nance is not in the mix. I have figured, that Nance wanted to merge with Studebaker, because Vance and Hoffman were willing to step aside and let Nance be the big shot. Without Nance, then Vance and Hoffman step aside for Mason and Romney.