My recent tome on how Rambler survived the 50s focused on the cars, statistics and some commonly accepted snippets of Nash/Rambler/AMC history. It didn’t adequately delve into the key player that made it happen, George Romney, as well as many important details of the history of Nash/Rambler/AMC during the years he was there. Romney was arguably the best automotive CEO of the era; his vision, determination, salesmanship and solid judgment were instrumental to the company’s survival during the crisis of the mid-’50s and the spectacular success in the latter years of his tenure.
The book “George Romney – An American Life” by Patrick Foster, provides the key source for this overview of Romney’s career at Nash/AMC. It not only fills in a lot of gaps, but also debunks some commonly-regurgitated “facts” and assumptions. I’m going to share those here in a condensed version, although I do recommend the book, not only for the AMC era but as an excellent portrait of Romney’s life.
Romney had been the president of the AMA (Automobile Manufacturers Association) since 1939. His intelligence, political, organizational and persuasive skills were put to good use there, but by 1948, he was feeling restless. He felt something bigger was out there waiting for him. Word got out that he was available.
His first offer came from Packard, and a very appealing one it was, for 40-year-old Romney: a fat $50k per year for the first two years as Executive VP, after which he’d become President and CEO with a large increase in salary. It was a very tempting offer, as Packard was of course still a very solid and prestigious company at that time. After some consideration (and prayer) he decided to accept it. President of Packard in two years, at the age of at 42? It sounded mighty good, if a bit ambitious.
Before formally doing that he needed to resign from the AMA, whose current chairman was George Mason, Chairman, CEO and President of Nash-Kelvinator. When Mason heard from Romney, he convinced him to hold off and discuss a counter-proposal to come to work for him instead.
Mason had done an excellent job of stabilizing Nash after the Depression, and had brought Kelvinator along with him as part of the deal to take leadership at Nash. Mason had ambitious plans for the post-war era, to increase production to some 360k and 1.1 million appliances per year. N-K also had an excellent export operation, and several assembly plants outside of its main factory in Kenosha. It was well situated after the end of the war.
Mason showed Romney prototypes of the 1949 Airflyte cars, which were very ambitious, with their radical streamlining and other features. But what really impressed Romney was a prototype of the upcoming 100″ wheelbase 1950 smaller car—the future Rambler—not yet named. Romney had just absorbed the contents of AMA’s recent in-depth analysis of the use patterns of American car owners, and it pointed to significant changes: As Americans rapidly moved to the suburbs, average trip lengths were becoming shorter, as many frequent trips were being made to the store, school, etc., which had previously not been undertaken by cars. This pointed out that second cars were going to become inevitable, as women were not going to be able to function without a car.
Romney felt strongly that these women were going to prefer a smaller car, for obvious reasons of parking, ease of handling and fuel economy. The 100″ wheelbase prototype that Mason showed him made a deep impression on him: this was the car of the future, a new category between the little imports and big American cars, one he could really get behind.
Mason’s offer to Romney was not nearly as financially attractive: He would have to spend two years learning the automobile and appliance business inside-out as Mason’s assistant, at $30k per year. After that he would likely become a VP, but no guarantees. Romney did some difficult soul-searching and decided to accept Mason’s offer, as he felt that the timetable at Packard was too ambitious, given his lack of experience. He also just preferred Mason, who was intelligent, hard-working, warm, and had the highest ethics. Mason had vision, unlike Packard, whose management was dominated by lots of old men seemingly trying to relive the glory years of the fading company.
Mason’s vision included a merger of some of the key independents as well as some parts makers, in order to create the scale and efficiencies necessary to compete with the Big Three. He had already sounded out Hudson and Packard back in 1946 in an effort to create the “Big Fourth”, but since both were doing well at the time, he was turned down.
Romney threw himself into his two year apprenticeship, putting on overalls at times, working in all aspects of appliance and automobile production. Romney had worked hard physically starting as a young boy and was not afraid to get his hands dirty. Not only did he learn all the technical aspects, but in the process also discovered that communications in the company were poor, and that the union situation, particularly at the Kelvinator factory, was very dysfunctional. Supervisors were in the union, so there was no actual supervision. There was rampant abuse of company paid time for crap and card games, and small businesses were being run right out of the factory floor, all on company time. Productivity was falling fast, hurting Kelvinator’s profitability. Mason was spread too thin to properly manage the large company.
In February 1950, Romney became a VP, but still without a specific portfolio, handling various assignments that Mason delegated to him. Around this time, the new 100″ wb Rambler premiered, which Romney had wanted to name “Diplomat”, but was outvoted. Shortages of various parts and materials factored into the decision to limit production only to high end body styles and trim levels, and priced accordingly. The Rambler was well-met, and established its image as a cut (or two) above the typical lower-end of the market, never mind the cheapest cars on the market. It sold well to women and wealthier buyers as a second car. The model range was expanded to include a wagon and in 1951, a two-door hardtop.
Romney tackled the very difficult problem with the union at Kelvinator by appealing directly to the workers, telling them that the plant was imperiled by its inefficiency. One of Romney’s superpowers was his persuasiveness; he was at his best trying to convince others of the right thing, whether that was changing union control of supervisors, selling America’s consumers on the advantages of the compact Rambler, or convincing financiers that AMC had a future. No wonder he ended up in politics. After a months-long campaign that included over 60 letters to workers, the foremen agreed to withdraw from the union. It would be the first of many difficult but successful union battles, always won through persuasion rather than ultimatums and strikes.
In late 1953, Mason and Romney reached a preliminary agreement with Hudson, which was now in deep financial crisis. While that agreement was being hashed out by the respective boards, Mason had Romney approach Packard about creating a three-way merger. It was a solid plan, as Nash and Packard were still in good financial health, and ailing Hudson had a large dealer network, instrumental to expanding Rambler’s reach.
As an alternative to full mergers, Romney had also put forth what would be called an alliance today, with major reciprocal buying and selling of parts and components to each other, to achieve necessary scale. This “reciprocity concept” was seen as an essential fallback in lieu of a full merger.
The talks with Packard quickly hit a major obstacle: James Nance (above) had been hired as Packard’s president, also from the appliance industry (GE’s Hotpoint division). He demanded that he be named CEO of the newly merged company, despite his lack of automotive industry experience. Mason simply wouldn’t accept that.
The commonly-held (and oft repeated) myth that Mason also wanted to bring Studebaker into a four-way merger is also refuted. According to Romney “I was in on all the merger discussions and there were no talks with Studebaker”. Mason was not interested in Studebaker for quite practical and obvious reasons: Studebaker had the highest labor costs in the industry, and they were solidly entrenched in South Bend, Indiana, which would have posed a major logistical problem in any consolidation of production. Studebaker was seen as too directly competitive to Nash and Rambler, and Studebaker’s narrow BOF body construction meant there was little or no possibility for sharing a body shell with the significantly larger and wider big unibody Nash and Hudson.
Mason and Romney appear to not have been very enamored of Studebaker all-round, considered Nash’s unibody construction to be superior, and that their engineering priorities, such as world-leading HVAC and other comfort aspects (reclining seats, etc.) were more market-oriented than Studebaker’s priorities. Even Raymond Loewy, Studebaker’s design consultant, was frustrated by Studebaker’s management and their unwillingness to make their dull and drab interiors more contemporary. He was told by management that “Studebakers are bought by old and retired men“. That’s about the polar opposite of Rambler’s target demographic. It’s perhaps best summed up by saying that Studebaker was from Mars, Nash was from Venus.
In 1953, Henry Ford II decided to go nuclear, and launched an all-out volume battle with Chevrolet, vowing to outsell them or kill the company trying. Neither of those two things happened, but the collateral damage to the independents was absolutely deadly. It might have well been Henry’s war on the independents. Ford and Chevy cranked up their recently expanded production plants and flooded the market with heavily discounted cars. The independents, which already had higher prices (and costs) to start with, were now in an existential crisis, one that would last for some four years.
A.E. Barit, retired Hudson president, Mason and Romney
Nash-Kelvinator had been a very healthy company before this was war broke out, but by early 1954, they were losing money, as was Packard. Meanwhile, the merger with Hudson was consummated in May 1954, by which time it was essentially moribund. American Motors was born.
Mason and Romney made a final run at a merger with Packard, including a presentation to the board that was well-received. But Nance wouldn’t budge from his demand to be the CEO, and talked his board out of their decided inclinations towards a merger.
Mason and Romney wasted no time in extracting maximum value from the merger with Hudson. Within the same month, it was announced that Hudson car production would be consolidated with Nash, using the Nash body. It was hoped that some defense contracts could be found for the Hudson plant.
AMC was in desperate need of a V8 engine to stay competitive, but Mason and Romney had no desire to spend the large sum to develop and build one. Of course if Packard had merged with AMC, they would have brought their fine V8 (and automatic transmission) with them, a key asset in Mason and Romney’s eyes. So in August of 1954 they resorted to buying the engines and transmissions from Packard. In exchange, Packard agreed to buy components from AMC, in roughly comparable dollar amounts. Since Packard had no body plant, Mason and Romney assumed Packard would buy substantial body stampings from the now-idle Hudson plant. This was a key element of the “reciprocity” concept that had been the fallback in lieu of a merger.
Only six weeks later, Mason died suddenly from pancreatitis. Romney was in shock, but delivered a stirring eulogy. After the funeral, Romney found himself in a fight with the board of directors, who were not prepared to give him all three of Mason’s titles: Chairman, CEO and President. Once again, his powers of persuasion stood him well, and eventually the board acquiesced. AMC’s iffy future was now solely on his shoulders.
Although it was realistically a non-starter, due to Nance’s CEO demands, the issue of some arrangement with Packard-Studebaker was still in the air, especially by the media and Wall Street – as something, anything, to better survive the raging price and volume war seemed increasingly a necessity. But bad blood was spilled when Nance started bad-mouthing Romney behind his back.
Romney continued to defend his position, pointing out that AMC had a much higher level of working capital, and that he (rightfully) didn’t see just where there could be any synergies between Studebaker and Packard, as their bodies were so different, and that it would take at least two years and a massive investment to create a new body that could be shared by both.
Instead, Romney put his energies to the difficult task of convincing potential customers and dealers that AMC was a viable concern, and one with a future. It was an uphill battle, as consumers were increasingly wary of being stuck with an orphan car, creating a self-fulfilling prophesy. Romney was ideally suited for the job, and there is no question that his determination, sincerity, and enthusiasm were almost certainly the key ingredients that allowed AMC to survive the following two years, when things only became increasingly difficult.
The situation with Nance came to a head when it became obvious that Packard-Studebaker was not going to order parts from AMC, reneging on the “reciprocity” agreement. Romney was furious, and telegraphed Nance, who took his time responding, pointing out that there was a loophole in the contract that allowed S-P an out. It was a technicality, but Romney was a man of his word, and expected the same of those he did business with. It was the last straw.
Romney instantly told his VP of engineering to begin the design of a V8 engine, a project that would cost some $10 million at a time when the company was bleeding money. But Romney was determined to cut off all relations with S-P. The irony is that the Packard V8 was killed just three years later, and its assembly/transfer line sold for scrap.
There were issues closer at home too: a number of AMC execs were not really on board with the direction towards smaller cars, and still in love with the big cars, despite their steadily declining sales. A similar situation existed within the Nash-Hudson dealer body. Romney addressed both issues, and quite effectively, purging the executive ranks of those that couldn’t get on board, re-organizing the executive structure, and effectively convincing the dealers of Rambler’s bright future. He instituted a bonus program for the dealers, whereby all dealers got additional amounts per car as certain company sales goals were met. It incentivized the dealers and gave them access to desperately needed additional cash during the dark years. As it was, AMC’s dealer network dropped from 2800 stores in 1954 to 1900 in 1956.
Romney also instigated a complete make-over in AMC’s advertising, moving it away from the vague, dreamy ads typical of the time to very factual-based advertising. Superlatives were out; facts and “news language” were in, with ads focused on the very specific features that made Ramblers unique and/or superior.
1954 would end with a loss of over $22 million, but Romney was optimistic that 1955 would see an upswing.
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Very nice piece. I remember vaguely in the 2012 election some muttering of associations of George Romney being anti-union as well as somehow responsible for AMC going out of business. This article shows that to be entirely NOT the case.
What I was thinking is that union power was reaching a high-water mark in this period where it had been in decline for decades by 2012.
Direct talks with Reuther, then, were a wise move. Also because while the conundrum for labor is obvious – you can’t do well if the company’s not doing well, don’t kill goose that laid the golden egg etc – from management perspective there’s something akin to the belling-cat phenomenon in play. It’s in no employer’s interest to be forced to pay workers more, it’s in every employer (manufacturer or service provider)’s interest that all workers be paid more. People making sub-living wages don’t buy new cars.
We’ve managed to keep things patched up for a long time on ever-cheaper and easier credit, but that still lay in the future in Romney’s day. 1/3 down on a 3-year note was the standard consumer auto loan and would be for a while longer.
If any one man is responsible for the slow death of AMC, it’s Roy Abernethy. I’m reminded of the political parallel here…George H.W. Bush was a loyal VP to Ronald Reagan for eight years, yet barely a year after taking office he asked his Cabinet members, “How much longer do I have to wait until I can raise taxes?!” – Bush just didn’t get it.
When George Romney decided to leave AMC to run for the governorship of Michigan, Roy Abernethy was tapped to take his place. Abernethy chafed for years under Romney’s almost missionary zeal to promote small, well-built, well-trimmed cars. The moment Abernethy assumed command, his mission was to abandon the market AMC virtually owned and try to take on the Big 3 by making larger cars – leaving the compact market segment to the imports and the American big guys. In one view, AMC produced some of its most beautiful vehicles under his aegis…but he also cut the legs off of AMC’s core market and reduced AMC to triviality.
I’d like to know more about the merger of AMC and BMC, which sounds very interesting
They were just approaches. I’d say it’s a very good thing it never amounted to anything.
BMC was of course building the Metropolitan for American Motors, so there was already a substantial connection. It’s not surprising that they would have discussed bigger ideas at some point.
Seems to me, the REALLY interesting merger or association would have been with Mazda. Their involvement with the rotary engine was still in the developmental stage back then, but otherwise their commitment to quality rivalled that of Toyota …and with the advent of the R100 and RX-series of cars, AMC would have been a shoe-in to use a rotary engine in the Pacer as was originally envisioned.
You spoil us with these great postings.
It was exciting and fascinating to read.
Although I knew a great deal about AMC history, I had no idea how close it came to going bust. I see the products from 1955 to 1958, and can’t imagine those cars being unsuccessful. They became so iconic during the 1960s, I couldn’t imagine them ever being hard to sell when they were new.
AMC’s popularity between 1958-1964 seem to be similar to other suddenly-popular car lines, in that suddenly, everyone wants it without realizing how many of their neighbors want it too. It benefited from a wave, a fad, a moment when Rambler was suddenly the answer to American’s travel needs.
Fascinating.
Romney obviously deserves the credit of accomplishing this. His Mormon underdog roots polished him for the job. Being born in Mexico in an ex-pat Mormon settlement refusing to abolish polygamy, meant from the moment he understood his unique predicament, he needed to ignore the cat-calls, ostracizing, and heckling surrounding him, and believe in himself. Selling Mormonism was a lot harder than selling a Rambler, and Romney believed in both to his very core.
Kudos also goes to Mason who recognized Romney’s potential. Mason seems to have had a knack of recognizing a wave building from which he could benefit. Mason understood how to survive against the Detroit 3, and had he lived longer, would have really enjoyed seeing the fruits of his planning. Mason gave us the first real compact car, and the Metropolitan, a captive import from England. He built AMC when the other independents were lacking any vision.
Also Studebaker was a mess and it couldn’t be saved by any merger. They were in a hole and no amount of money could have turned Studebaker around. We might imagine today that they could have become our own version of Subaru, or Volvo, however, Studebaker was not salvageable. It was smart for Mason and Romney to avoid the fate Packard suffered partnering up with that bottomless pit in South Bend Indiana.
You spoil us Paul.
Thank you!
They became so iconic during the 1960s, I couldn’t imagine them ever being hard to sell when they were new.
Tell me about it. Iowa City was crawling with Rambler wagons when we moved there and in 1960 and for a few years more.
Americans are highly prone to fads, and the Rambler was a big one. It suddenly seemed like the better way to go; a more compact but still plenty roomy car. In that period, it was seen as smart and stylish.
But that obviously didn’t last. The next fad was the Mustang, as well as the more stylish intermediate cars from GM, among others.
I do not see just how American Motors could have maintained the momentum of 1958-1960. They rode a wave that they had largely initiated, but it led to nowhere. It would have taken someone with much more vision that Abernethy to see a viable future.
I can think of several possibilities, but that’s easier to do in hindsight.
Clearly Abernethy’s strategy of going up against the Big Three was fated to fail.
Indeed, had James Nance swallowed his pride and decide to play second fiddle who knowere Nash/AMC would had been.
Then another car come to my mind, what if AMC had greenlighted the Budd XR-400 instead of the Marlin?
On Studebaker-Packard, Jim Nance would be one of my candidates for worst auto executive, ever. As the story highlights, Nance had not one but ‘two’ opportunities to merge Packard with Nash. Yet, thanks entirely to his pigheaded desire to be unquestionably in charge, it didn’t happen.
Instead, Nance merged Packard with the 100% loser Studebaker, and Packard quickly became history. Yeah, it bought Studebaker time to get the initially successful Lark into production, but was it worth losing Packard to forestall Studebaker’s eventual going under (which was going to happen sooner or later, anyway)?
It’s one of those great ‘what ifs’ that we’ll never know how a Nash-Hudson-Packard company would have fared (with Studebaker’s demise coming all that much sooner). It could have gotten Rambler into a better model-to-model marketing position with the Big 3 earlier than when Ray Abernethy took over AMC from Romney
The heck of it is that Studebaker should have been the independent juggernaut after the war, with volumes far higher than Nash and a truck line besides. But management wouldn’t invest in the operation when times were fat. The real mental exercise is what if Romney had taken over Studebaker in 1950.
Indeed, it does sound like Kelvinator and Studebaker had similar issues, specifically labor problems. Studebaker, to the very end, never had an organized labor action. Essentially, management always gave the union whatever they wanted to keep the assembly lines running. Unfortunately, it also meant that Studebaker had the highest labor costs in the industry. An independent could never compete with the Big 3 in that manner.
If Romney had been at Studebaker, you can bet he’d have dealt with that situation in a hurry (just like he did at Kelvinator).
The Packard Board of Directors was determined to merge with Studebaker. There is a real question as to whether Nance could have stopped the merger, given the Board’s determination to move in this direction.
About Nance and Packard – the Packard board would have been an anchor for Romney’s AMC evolution. It wasn’t just Nance, it was Packard leadership. I have read in the 1961 Time write up about Romney, that the Packard board was old and conservative. It is possible that with Packard’s investment into AMC, there would have been problems with Romney’s shift to small cars. It is possible that with the cash Packard had – they could have removed Romney when times got rough.
Great story on AMC. The old AMC headquarters on Plymouth Road still stands, although abandoned after Chrysler moved Jeep-Truck engineering out to Auburn Hills.
Besides his success in industry, George Romney had many different talents which separated him from most politicians of his time. In early 1968, after a defense department sponsored tour of Vietnam, which he as well as other politicians attended, he described the experience as having been “brain washed.” He was widely attacked for this comment and it ended his campaign for the republican nomination for the presidency. Years later, it was disclosed that the defense department did indeed intentionally mislead attendees about war progress and other matters during these tours.
He also sired a son, of whom he could be justifiably proud.
Nash (Kelvinator) first made refrigerators, then they made cars that looked likes fridges on wheels. This is not only cool, this is true heroism.
I recently acquired some 1958 & ’59 Rambler brochures, and I was impressed with the way the photographers & artists made the cars look clean, sharp, colorful, and contemporary (Like the red ’60 on p. 2). This, despite the (later?) Rambler reputation as “dull” or “uncool”. To a buyer looking for an alternative to “longer, lower, wider”, (but still “American looking”), these would be appear to be a smart, socially acceptable choice.
Would have preferred to see Nash & Hudson continued as separate (albeit badge engineered) versions of Ambassador, with unique styling and features. But Romney made the most profitable choice. I admire Romney, but if everyone (including Harley Earl) were square like him, the fascinating exuberance of the ’50s would have never happened!
Auto history (in fact ALL history) is really the story of PEOPLE–their inspirations, talents, visions, and . . . foibles. And once those people move on (or pass on), that unique spark vanishes, and those who come after will not do things the way their predecessors did. I think that’s what happened to AMC post-Romney. Part of our problem is that human lifespans are just too short (my opinion).
” Part of our problem is that human lifespans are just too short.”
Until someone like Elon Musk comes along and shows what can be accomplished before you turn 50…
According to Wikipedia, quoting “Time” magazine, (perhaps with a grain of salt?) the success of the Nash Rambler was assisted by the release, in the Autumn of 1958, of the song “Beep Beep”, by the Playmates. The lyrics suggested that a Nash Rambler, while stuck in second gear, could keep up with a Cadillac. (I somehow doubt that!).
https://genius.com/The-playmates-beep-beep-lyrics
+1 on ‘Beep, beep’ highlighting the popularity of the Rambler. Most popular car songs are about stylish, performance cars. Yet, here was one about a practical economy car. I remember listening to it when I was a kid and wondering what was the big deal about taking a car out of second gear. It wasn’t until much later that I learned the reference was to the Rambler Flashaway (GM Hydramatic) 2-speed automatic transmission.
The Hydramatic was a 4-speed automatic transmission.
Must have been an Ultramatic.
The performance of early Ramblers was a lot better than the reputation. Uncle Tom loved them, and testers for Motor Trend agreed. A ’52 was entered in the Darlington 500, mainly stock, and finished in the middle of the field.
Good point. Maybe the Rambler in ‘Beep Beep’ was a 1957 Rebel (which could be had with the 2-speed Flashaway automatic, too).
Didn’t y’all always fake a shift out of second when you went by actually all wound out? LoL
I made an impulse purchase of a Rumbler when about 400 miles from home, probably to relieve the “cabin fever” in the ElCamino three of us were riding in. LoL Anyway, on the way home we figured out that 327 Ambassador would give 350 Elc a good run for the money.
Ramblers were an impressive combination of performance and fuel efficiency at a great price. Nobody else in America had a car that would top 100mph and also capable of 20mpg with an engine that outlasted pretty much everything else available. They were impressive cars, mechanically, for their time period, but didnt have the flashy looks or the v8 sound so they werent a “car guy’s” choice.
I cant express how impressed i am by the rambler. Choose the optional engine in a plain 2 door with the 4speed manual and you got one helluva capable car that can do Bakersfield to Tulsa or Reno to Des Moines high speed runs non stop over and over no problems. You’ll grow old and wear out before it will. If it werent for the fact that cumulative costs of oil and filter and maintenance costs exceeded the price of a good used one there’d still be lots of them on the road. Once people figured out it made financial sense to drive them into the dirt without any maintenance, thats what they did. A cashiers check and the title in the glovebox along with the registration for the day it quit was how it was done.
All the car manufacturers would accept customer custom-build orders but – except for AMC – didn’t bruit the option, as they wanted to sell what they’d already built and had, collecting dust, in dealers’ showrooms. (Chevy’s COPO program is just one example.) AMC gladly took special orders…and the customers doing so were quite pleased, as the assembly-line workers tended to pay special attention to those cars. My dad loved our ’63 Classic wagon so much, he decided two years later to get another Rambler – but not off the lot. He special-ordered a ’65 Ambassador 990 4DR sedan, with front bucket seats, center console, 287 V8 mated to a 4spd manual transmission, and power everything. He told me, years later, he shelled out $5100 for the car which was almost 60% over the base price of a run-of-the-mill Ambassador. I guess that, at 39, this was his mid-life-crisis gentleman’s hot rod. Our family made a lot of trips around the country in that car, and it got a LOT of curious looks from people at filling stations.
I would think Romney was also responsible for the tie-up with Renault that led to the Rambler-Renault Classic being built in Belgium starting in 1962. Per Wikipedia, that deal was signed on November 21, 1961. Perhaps if more had been made of the Renault relationship during Roy Abernathy’s tenure, AMC might have been positioned to share Renault’s overwhelming competitive advantage in small cars at the time of the 1973 oil crisis. A Pacer or Hornet with a Renault 12- or 16-based FWD layout would have been very interesting during the 1970s.
What a great lunchtime read! Thanks for this deep dive into early AMC.
I think it is fair to say that the tag-team of Mason and Romney may have been the strongest management team in the entire US auto industry. Nash/AMC was certainly better run than any of the independents, and almost certainly Chrysler by that time, as well. Both Mason and Romney saw things that nobody else saw, and beyond that they were good with the basic blocking and tackling that made the whole thing work smoothly. I do love Studebaker (and Packard) but their managements had been a mess for ages by 1953, and almost every one of their successes was in spite of their management, not because of it.
I think our divergent backgrounds affects how we view the Rambler. While they may have been new and hip among the college professor crowd that surrounded you, they were anything but in my neck of the woods. My parents were of the generation and demographic that new and hip were aiming at in the late 50s – their new cars in this period were an Anglia, a Karmann Ghia and an early Olds F-85. Neither they nor anyone in the extended family on either side nor anyone in our neighborhood, nor anyone we knew owned a Rambler. I take that back – the neighbor kid’s Grandpa Bob had a Rambler, but he is all I can think of.
I would say that before 1958 the Rambler was a well-built car trying desperately to find a niche where it could make money. The new 56 Rambler was not really a success any more than it had been in 1954-55. Which makes sense, because it wasn’t all that much smaller than a basic Ford/Chevy of 1954. But by 1958 there was nothing else of any reasonable size at the same time when the economy went to crap and a smaller, high quality car was suddenly hot – events conspired to open a wide lane for AMC and the company was ready with the right product to fill the need (much in the way the Chevy Suburban was there to take advantage of changing market conditions in the second half of the 80s).
This story reminds us that gifted, visionary people running car companies is the exception, not the rule.
While they may have been new and hip among the college professor crowd that surrounded you, they were anything but in my neck of the woods.
They might have been so to the grownups, but not to me! They invariably had sixes and had a pathetic exhaust sound. My eyes (back then) were only on the gas-guzzling dinosaurs. 🙂
In 1960 our Explorer Scout leader (and local FBI agent) had a yellow 1957 of 1958 Rambler station wagon. It was a solid yellow base model. He took five of us camping on a two+ week trip to west Texas where we camped at three different rances owned by his friends. What a grand time we had. We stayed in tents or under the stars, did our own cooking (mostly), swam in three different rivers, and hiked all over the place. The Rambler pulled a six foot trailer with all our gear and also took us on excursions to various sights in Texas. We must have covered a couple of thousand miles altogether.
The trip was the swan song for the Rambler. Within a week of our return home it was traded for a cute Rambler American convertible. That car became my good buddy and fellow scouts car several years later. Looking back I can see that was the plan all along.
I offered wondered if FBI agent/governmet employees were offered special deals on Ramblers.
What a fascinating story – I knew a bit of this from the business perspective, but reading about Romney’s personality and the effect that his interpersonal skills had on AMC’s survival made me realize that I’ve read virtually nothing about him personally, and that I’ve really missed out.
There’s many interesting angles to this story, but his ability to deal with labor issues, during an era when unions and management were at ridiculous odds with each other just about everywhere, is perhaps the most intriguing part of the story for me.
Also, I hadn’t realized quite the extent to which Romney had become a pariah to the Big Three execs. I’m wondering how quickly that changed once Romney became governor — I suppose that Romney had the ability, like Churchill, to forgive old enemies, which is a leadership quality that’s often overlooked. Sure beats being perpetually vengeful.
Thanks for this writeup, and I’ve added Foster’s book to my reading list.
I suspect that didn’t last long. He was still one of them, ultimately. Well, sort, of, anyway.
The Achilles heel for George and Mitt is what made them successful – their religion. While both have succeeded in many ways, they overestimate themselves and underestimates others. Both have a belief that no one is more moral than they. Their religion put great demands on their lives, both private and public, yet it also caused both men to believe that only they could solve any problems. Good team leaders, but not good team players.
Consequently they choose to stand apart from their fellows on many issues, make pronouncements showing their superior morality, then wonder why they have few close allies.
I am not sure how a man who doesn’t smoke and drink can be handicapped by his religion.
I am equally unsure if there is any basis in fact for what you write.
You must not know many missionaries.
FWIW, I believe the Marriott hotel chain is a Mormon organization. Other than charging for local telephone calls in their early days, I’ve always found their lodging among the best for business travelers.
Yes, everyone remembers that critical Romney speech where he said “I alone can fix it” and we know how that turned out.
Oh wait, that was some other guy.
Always liked the way Romney did business. But, being a fashion business more than a technical one, the automotive winners were not always the sensible ones.
Incidentally, those bathtub unibody Nashes of the early 1950s were real rust buckets. They were astonishing in that the rust enveloped the whole upper body, not just sills and rear quarters.
Paul, your work of late has been some of your best. Thank you for the effort you put into pieces like this. I never knew much about American Motors but now I know much more.
I am too young to have experienced the Rambler fad of the late 1950’s but I understand why they were popular. They were a well made and well sized car sold for a reasonable price. I bought my Golf SportWagen for the exact same reasons.
The world has changed so much and it seems many are willing to spend a higher proportion of their income on a vehicle than in the past. There are right sized cars that sell for a reasonable price but it appears to me they don’t sell well. There’s really no place for a modern Rambler in the North American market.
Had Willys-Overland / Kaiser-Jeep played their cards right* before merging / being acquired by AMC in 1960 (as mentioned in the article below), it is likely AMC could have been in an even stronger position and negated the need for merger agreements with either Volkswagen or BMC.
* By way of the following:
– A post-war 4-cylinder only successor to the Willys 77/Americar that could slot below the Rambler/Rambler American and directly replace the Metropolitan, together with a properly conceived Willys Aero.
– A pre-war or post-war OHV conversion of the pre-war Willys 77 4-cylinder / stillborn Willys 99 6-cylinder aka Go Devil/Lightning later Hurricane 4/6-cylinder engines
– Production version of the 288-327 Kaiser V8 with 90-degree V6 derivative to replace alternate OHV Hurricane 6-cylinder (in place of the Buick V6)
https://www.indieauto.org/2021/01/22/1933-42-willys-offered-a-better-template-for-an-import-beater/
Even though AMC and Studebaker-Packard could not come to an agreement, with there being underlining problems with the Studebaker side and Packard being the more salvageable of the two.
It is interesting to speculator how things could have evolved had both Studebaker and Packard remedied their issues beforehand as mentioned in the following two articles for Studebaker, where it is posited that had it been developed properly the Studebaker V8 could have been comparable to the SBC V8 with Studebaker also having at the time the only passenger-car platform flexible enough to be used for both a larger and a compact car.
https://www.curbsideclassic.com/automotive-histories/engine-history-the-studebaker-v8/
https://www.indieauto.org/2019/10/01/1951-studebaker-pointing-in-the-wrong-direction/
As for the proposed merger agreement with BMC, the latter would have probably been better off acquiring Willys-Overland / Kaiser-Jeep on the basis of the Jeep itself having indirect ties to Austin via American Austin / American Bantam together with Austin/BMC’s own 4×4 efforts being lackluster (despite the Austin “D-Series” 4/6-cylinder petrol and diesel engines being a reverse-engineered version of the 2nd gen 216 Chevrolet Straight-6).
AMC would have also benefited from an earlier more equal partnership or alliance with Renault during the 1960s by way of Kaiser-Jeep’s and their presence in South America.
There was the 1965 Jeep/Renault Model H: A light 4×4 prototype based on the Renault 16.
The South American built Renault 12 which AMC would have used to develop a smaller model, the former being to the latter what the Audi 80 / VW Passat (B1) was to the Brazilian built VW Gol (BX). Since not sure if a US built three-box version of the Renault 14 would a viable alternative to the above or if the Renault X-Type engines could be made US emissions compliant (not to mention the end-on gearbox layout).
AMC could have also made use of the Renault A-Type engines which via the Renault 114 Project were capable of spawning inline-6 engines as well as played an earlier role in the development the 2.0-2.2 Renault J-Type Douvrin 4-cylinder engine in place of the 2-litre EA831 used in the Gremlin, Spirit, Concord, etc.
In my neck of the woods, in addition to being popular with women and the egg-head crowds, Ramblers were very popular with senior citizens because of their fuel economy and comparatively low operating costs. As the 1960s progressed Rambler lost some of their sales to the mid-sized and compact cars offered by the Big 3, but there was a loyal group of customers who traded in their Ramblers for AMC Hornets, Concords, and even Eagles right up to the end when AMC was bought out by Chrysler. The AMC Hornet Sportabout was the successor to the Rambler wagons of the 1950s and for several years it was the only compact American wagon available.
Great article! I’ve been reading the huge book The Reckoning, on how the US Auto industry really paved the way for competition from the Japanese (and then the Koreans) that the Big 3 really weren’t prepared for. The argument in there is that the Big 3 was indeed essentially a monopoly that stifled competition, and quit taking risks, and breaking new ground. I haven’t finished the 700 page book yet, but I’m learning a lot I didn’t know about the Japanese and the US auto industries and their respective leaders. Romney was truly one of the brightest and best (even if Ford had the supposed “Whiz Kids”). Thanks, Paul!
Fascinating article. The longer the article, the more interesting they get. Does anyone under the age of 40 know what an amc is? I hear the names studebaker and Packard and I can recognize a 50s studebaker but they don’t really mean much to me, having vanished from the automotive landscape years before I was born. I learnt a lot reading this.
In the ’55 Rambler “Mickey Mouse” sales film, starting at :47, what are the cars that the Rambler is parking between ?
The car in front is a Nash Healey. The car in the rear looks like a ‘50 Nash Rambler.
Another great article Paul-thanks for your fascinating article on George Romney-he was certainly an interesting individual. I agree that AMC’s best years were from about 1958 until 1963, as you point out, the company’s products sold well due to the ’58 recession and negative public reaction to the big 3’s overstyled vehicles and their build quality- from what I’ve read Chrysler’s products from that period lasted about eighteen months before falling apart. American Motors invented the intermediate body style, something that the other automakers certainly noticed and began working on their own versions.
For all of his qualities, and maybe because of his Mormon upbringing I sometimes felt Romney regarded automobiles as somewhat utilitarian vehicles as opposed to Sloan’s views of automobiles as status symbols. In my opinion, I felt a lot of AMC’s advertising was the equivalent of Mormon sermonizing on the evils of horsepower, speed and racing-their ad campaign of the ’60s-“The Sensible Spectaculars” comes to mind. By the mid-sixties the image of AMC was that their cars were driven by penny-pinches, bookeepers and maiden aunts, not a terribly great image.
Romney left AMC in 1963 for politics and I’ve always wondered if Romney saw the handwriting on the wall regarding the company’s vehicles and it’s image and being aware of what the other companies were planning(like the Ford Mustang for example) and decided to get out before things turned against AMC.
Absolutely the best explanation of Romney and his role in the survival and success of AMC in its first, most challenging period. Thanks Paul for researching, writing and presenting such a thorough history. It will be the standard recommended go-to source from here forward!
“Romney felt strongly that these women were going to prefer a smaller car, for obvious reasons of parking, ease of handling and fuel economy. The 100″ wheelbase prototype that Mason showed him made a deep impression on him: this was the car of the future, a new category between the little imports and big American cars, one he could really get behind.”
Obviously his thinking has gone wildly off the rails in this day and age as women are driving big SUVs and trucks which took the place of big full size four door cars. The draw to go big never really went away.
Power assists made a huge difference, plus you’re talking about two almost entirely different cohorts of women raised with very different expectations about their own abilities with regard to machinery.
AMC could very well have been still around, had Romney stayed at the helm. Growing up in the Winter, Water, Wonderland, and being from a family that owned quote a few AMC cars, this was a very interesting read.
Roy Abernathy was a flop for a replacement. A Packard flunky I think.
Abernethy ascended to the top when the Big Three and the imports were invading AMC’s niche.
Mason and Romney had been correct – plenty of Americans would buy a smaller vehicle, and low price wasn’t necessarily their main motivation.
The problem was that, by 1965, the Big Three were exploiting this phenomenon with cars like the Ford Mustang. If the choice was between a Rambler American 440-H and a Mustang fastback…guess which one most young Americans would choose?
Meanwhile, the Dodge Dart and Plymouth Valiant sedans with the slant six and Torqueflite were successfully attracting buyers who wanted a practical, sturdy and economical car. AMC was increasingly hemmed in from all sides.
Geeber makes good points.
Falcon and Chevy II/Nova took former Rambler owners, too, along with Chevelle/Fairlane/Coronet mid size class.
AMC became “old fogies” by 1965, and tried too hard to compete head on with Marlin, Ambassador, Matador and Pacer. Only Hornet, Javelin, and Gremlin were good matches to Big 3. But also, imports took small car market.
Buying Jeep in 1970 was best thing AMC did.
My parents were Rambler owners. 1960 Classic 6 and 1964 Classic wagon. But, when time to get newer cars in 1968-69, they were “sick of Ramblers”. Got used ’65 Mustang I6/3 speed manual for commuter car and 1969 full size Plymouth wagon. Mom went on to Cutlasses and then Toyotas, now a 2011 Prius [maybe last car]. Dad stuck with GM [Buick/Olds] after the Mustang til he passed 4 years ago.
You have to give then credit for the first fully integrated dashboard A/C system in cars based on their experience with Kelvinator.
GM and Ford were still hanging them under the dash as late as the mid 60’s.
Another very good article .
FWIW, the “BEEP-BEEP” song was written about the Nash Metropolitan .
I asked the man who wrote it .
-Nate