(More from David Halberstam’s “The Reckoning”) Having excoriated Ford’s finance guys for skimping out on E-Coat, today we turn the tables and find a very unlikely hero in the battle over whether the new Taurus should be FWD or RWD. And another one who advocated for Ford’s turn towards a radical new styling direction.
Pictured with the 1984 Ford Tempo and Mercury Topaz are the four members of the Office of the Chief Executive (from left) Board Chairman Philip Caldwell, Executive Vice President Will M. Caldwell (no relation), President Donald E. Petersen and Vice Chairman William C. Ford.
Let’s take a look at the second example first. On the left in this picture is Phillip Caldwell, the first non-Ford to run the company. He was the ultimate “system” guy, meaning someone who always played by the rules and generally avoided taking any risky or extreme positions. He was the Chairman of Ford of Europe, which was Henry Ford II’s favorite duchy, as it was much less complicated and mostly devoid of the intense politics of the mothership. In Europe, Henry was a star, and it fed his growing need for a certain kind of attention as well as his new jet-setting habits with his second wife, Christina.
Iacocca and his sidekick Bill Bourke, a product genius who eventually was squeezed out because he would fight for his product ideas too vociferously even to Henry, both disliked Caldwell, and deemed him too vanilla and dispassionate. But after Henry fired Iacocca in 1978 (another story in itself), he did not want another swashbuckler. Thus Caldwell became President in 1978, and CEO in 1979, and then Chairman in 1980.
Caldwell was a control freak, and every activity, meeting, and even his daily departure from the office was highly orchestrated. Here’s how the last one went:
“The moment he was ready to leave at night, his secretary would pack his attache case and call down to his driver, who would be waiting in the garage of Ford headquarters. Then she would deposit the case in the executive elevator, in which it would travel down to the garage by itself. The chauffeur would enter the elevator, pick up the case, and put it in the car. A little later, Phillip Caldwell would descend, empty-handed. He would then remove his suit jacket and pass it to the driver, who would spread it carefully on the seat so it would not get wrinkled. There was considerable speculation on the part of his senior colleagues about why the attache case went down first, and they eventually came up with this conclusion: Caldwell thought that if people saw him going down the corridor with his attache case, they would know he was going home and would no longer work as hard in his absence.
Caldwell was also a non-smoker, a teetotaler and even drank no coffee or tea. That rubbed Henry the wrong way, but he soon got over it, as he was burned out from 35 years of having the heavy burden of the company on his shoulders. And Caldwell was not going to rock his boat.
But he made life difficult for all his subordinates, as he would essentially wear out the product and manufacturing guys by endless questions and new demands for answers, and in the process keep new projects stalled seemingly forever, until they just died from entropy. The product guys loathed him as a consequence.
But in 1980, as Ford was going through its worst crisis yet by far, due to having too many out-of-date big cars that were dying on the vine, Caldwell shocked everyone by a total turnaround: he suddenly pushed the designers for a completely new look, and pushed them hard.
When word got to Jack Telnack, designer of the ’78 Mustang, that Caldwell wanted a new and bold direction he and the others in the design studios were suspicious. But it was genuine, and it led to the aero look, a design revolution for Ford.
Early on in the program Caldwell asked: “Are you reaching far enough. Are you really different”?
It wasn’t just Caldwell either; new President Don Petersen went to see Telnack’s early models of the new 1983 Thunderbird, and asked him point-blank: “Is that really the best you can do? Would you really want to drive that yourself?” “No,” Telnack answered. “Then show me what you can do.”
The development of a new mid-size sedan that would eventually become the Taurus and Sable became the centerpiece of the new thrust. The 1983 Thunderbird and 1984 Tempo were the precursors, and involved considerably less development time, since the T-bird was really just a new exterior body on the previous T-bird’s hard points, and the Tempo was essentially a stretched Escort. But the heart of the market was in the mid/full-size sedan, and here’s where Ford needed to not hedge their bets as they had with the T-bird and Tempo.
Thanks to the unwavering encouragement of both Caldwell and Petersen, the question of the new sedan’s styling direction was established early on, and started with preliminary concepts like this Probe II, and soon became ever-more radical. But the question as to its underpinnings was not yet finalized. The company was essentially divided between the factions that advocated FWD and RWD.
Lou Veraldi, the chief engineer on the program, who had played a key role on the Fiesta, Ford’s first FWD car, was obviously totally in the FWD camp. But two key executives, both of whom hoped to succeed Caldwell as chairman in a few years, were on opposite sides of the table, and most surprisingly, each on the side one might least expect.
Phillip Caldwell, Don Petersen, Red Poling, the three fathers of the Taurus
Don Petersen was the president of Ford, and was a serious car guy and product man. He was spent a lot of time at Bob Bondurant’s high-speed driving school, which resulted in Mustangs being the school car there. And Petersen advocated for RWD in the new sedan, which seems inconsistent with his progressive and product-oriented rep.
Meanwhile, Red Poling, head of NA Operations and whose background was in finance, championed the more innovative and expensive FWD. He had the difficult task of reducing Ford’s fixed costs during this time of crisis, and was of the school of Ed Lundy. But he was also gunning for the top job, and knew he needed to prove that unlike Ed Lundy, he could handle operations. The Taurus was a vehicle for him to put his name on an exciting new product. And he rightfully pointed out that GM’s huge commitment to promote FWD was leading the public to increasingly expect that feature in new cars.
How to explain Petersen’s anti-FWD stance? Essentially the opposite reason for Poling’s position: he was known as the consummate product guy and had gobs of legitimacy in that role, but here he was trying to show that he could also be a cost-cutter: skipping FWD would save almost a billion and a half in costs. Ford was in the depths of its worst crisis, and he wanted to show he could be frugal too. One is tempted to say that it might also have been because he knew that RWD lent itself better to high performance versions, like the Mustang GT and LTD LX that he had championed. But he probably kept personal preferences like that to himself.
Ford Europe did quite well with its new RWD aero cars, the Sierra (1982) and the Scorpio (1985) here with Bob Lutz. Presumably Petersen has something similar in mind, and not just another new body on the aging Fox platform. It’s something to speculate about, and there’s no doubt that a RWD Taurus SHO would have been a more balanced and effective high performance sedan. The Taurus on the left is seen here with Louis R. Ross, who succeeded Poling as NA Operations head.
The sales and marketing people increasingly sided with FWD too, for understandable reasons. By the time Poling made his presentation to the board in 1982, its future looked increasingly secure, as a FWD sedan. As to Petersen, his objections disappeared quickly, and he became an enthusiastic supporter of the FWD Taurus.
In the spring of 1985, not long before the launch of the Taurus, Caldwell hit retirement age, although he hoped to stay on. Henry Ford would have none of that, and named Petersen as Chairman. That was hugely welcomed by the product people, as Caldwell was never liked, despite his support on the Taurus. Petersen was an exceptionally bright and interesting personality, and remarkably, he was the first to rise to the top having essentially avoided ever being in any of the political camps at Ford. He just refused to play that game, thanks to his exceptional self control. He was in every way the antithesis of Lee Iacocca. I profiled his tenure at Ford here some years ago. Petersen was my kind of CEO; if only there had been more.
Related: 1986 Taurus: Good Role Models and Clear Objectives Create a Breakthrough Car Ed S.
“And he rightfully pointed out that GM’s huge commitment to promote FWD was leading the public to increasingly expect that feature in new cars.”
GM and Chrysler are unsung American heroes of front wheel drive adoption. In the 1980s, they showed that FWD isn’t just something for quirky cars like Saabs or the Toronado/Eldorado, or small, cheap cars like the Ford Fiesta or Honda Civic, but can be a legitimate staple of your lineup – even the traditional family and luxury cars.
In Europe, that role was played by Volkswagen and Renault in the 70s, with their FWD lineups ranging from cheap hatchbacks like the Polo or 4, to sports cars like the Scirocco or 15/17, to fancier models like the Audi 100 or Renault 30.
Don’t underestimate the influence of the first two generations of the Honda Accord. While the Accord hadn’t yet grown to “mainstream family car” dimensions in the early 1980s, it was not viewed as cheap or quirky by American buyers.
It’s one thing when a foreign upstart – a successful one, but still not a major player – switches to FWD, but another when two of the Big Three make the same move in most of their cars.
Honda wasn’t even in the top five of carmakers in the US, being edged out by the Big Three, Toyota and Datsun/Nissan. By the mid-80s they still had less than 4% of the market, as opposed to Chrysler’s low teens and GM’s ~35%
The Accord’s influence went beyond its sales figures. It had a tremendous impact on buyers and other car companies. GM’s front-wheel-drive J-cars were a direct response to the Accord.
Accord sales were also constrained by a lack of production capacity. As a result, customers were placed on waiting lists for new Accords.
A good deal on an Accord during this era meant that the dealer only charged you the sticker price, and didn’t make you pay $200 for floor mats, $200 for mud flaps and $500 for a “dealer protection package.” (Translation – a wax job and Scotch Guard for the seats and carpet.)
it is interesting to contemplate FWD in the US had we not had CAFE. VW and Honda got the ball rolling in volume cars here. The Chrysler (Simca) L body was next, but Chrysler was not really influencing anyone right then (1978) and it was more curiosity than anything at first. FWD became the choice in the run-up to CAFE’s effective date because of its weight savings from better packaging. And of course by 1980-82 the public was convinced of the superiority of FWD in no little part because of GM’s wholesale rush into it. I remember how retrograde the Fox sedans seemed by 1984-85. Would they have seemed less so had they had more company in the market?
FWD has also become the norm in Europe without norms like CAFE (and it could be argued it did so earlier), so I suppose the layout’s inherent practicality would have made it the prime choice one way or another.
True enough, although Europe has placed a high prize on fuel efficiency in other ways via high taxes and fuel prices that have never been anywhere remotely near the US norms. And the only European vehicles that have had a sustained level of popularity here have been high end stuff from Germany (MB and BMW) which have remained RWD. VW and Audi have only gotten a solid foothold fairly recently and Volvo held out for a long time.
It is very possible that FWD would have prevailed anyway if only due to style and efficiency, although it has never made inroads in segments where economy has been close to a zero consideration. However, I wonder if Cadillac (as an example, and Lincoln belatedly) would have made that leap when it did without an external force like CAFE.
“although Europe has placed a high prize on fuel efficiency in other ways via high taxes and fuel prices that have never been anywhere remotely near the US norms”
And the engines have been proportionally smaller.
The US would experience the same switch to FWD, just with their bigger engines. After all, the 2nd round of GM downsizing was caused by GM fearing high fuel prices, not government mandates.
The mistake was basing the 1988 Lincoln Continental on the Taurus platform. An updated and restyled Fox-body platform (similar to what Ford did for the Mustang in 1994) could have worked for the Continental
Hang on JPC, Volvo brought out its first FWD 33 years ago. And Audi was scuppered by a non-existent scandal that nowt to do with FWD. And VW produced a delightful but evanescent flim-flam (Golf) to replace a an ugly stolid hero in the Beetle, and it was the meringue quality of the build that failed it, not the FWD-ness.
Frankly, 80% of the population wouldn’t know if their wagen was driven form the front or rear or by an invisible squirrel amidships, nor would they care. But when lots of USnians found the FWD vastly nicer in snowiness, they liked it.
Jim, your CAFE shtick is well past its done date.
Fuel prices in the 1970’s meant that American sleds had had their day.
A car company cannot use body on frame and steering box steering forever, especially with a 460 under the hood. Eventually, it is going to have to change its product line to remain competitive.
Like another poster pointed out, FWD was taking over the automobile market by 1980. It gives less weight and significantly better interior room.
The Taurus’ direct predecessor was unibody, only available with a 6 cylinder (excluding Police and LX) and had rack & pinion steering. Your own shtick that every American car prior to the modern era is the engineering equivalent of a 1979 Cadillac is too well past it’s done date.
Nonsense. There were plenty of unit body cars around, especially at Ford. The fact is, however, that Ford made big, fat profits on its big sleds.That’s why they refused to downsize when GM was doing so.
Said sleds did not sell after 1973.
My point is Ford didn’t make big sleds for 6 years before the Taurus hit showrooms. The Panther was downsized, with most equipped with the 302, and the mainstream product lines were all being shuffled to the Fox platform or the Escort platform.
Ford may have been late to follow GMs first wave of downsizing, but it in effect allowed them to dodge copying GMs “second wave” of downsizing that nearly obliterated them
The Taurus is proof that my “CAFE schtick” is on the money. I drove a brand new 86 Sable purchased by a friend. This was about 3 months after my mother bought a new 85 Crown Victoria. The Sable was set up a combination of power and gearing that was unlike any large-ish car I had driven since the 70s. I distinctly remember thinking that I wished my mother had waited 3 months because she bought the wrong car.
The Taurus was a joy to drive because there was no need to hobble it with stupid-tall axle ratios and extra-limp states of tune for the 5.0 in order to keep down the number of Escorts they would have to give away for free. The Sable’s aerodynamics allowed it to score very well on the fuel consumption tests which allowed the engineers to provide a more natural powertrain experience. It was a lot better than the fox-body Marquis wagon I later owned too, though not by as much.
The only problem is that Ford being Ford, the Taurus was not nearly as long-lived as the RWD stuff coming from the company at the same time.
Jim, perhaps you don’t want a car with low fuel consumption.
It pretty obvious that in 1986, buyers wanted better fuel efficiency.
Canada has never had fuel economy standards yet sleds fell from popularity just as fast as in the USA.
You know, Ford did have cars called a Mustang II, Mustang, Granada, Maverick, Pinto, Escort, Fairmont, Tempo, and (Fox)LTD in the 70s and 80s and it is a free market economy. Nobody was forcing anybody to buy 460 LTDs.
Perhaps people still wanted sleds but with better economy, not full lineups of fully downsized clown cars like GM offered in 1986. But nobody answered that demand until some market whiz realized they could could exploit a CAFE loophole and sell light trucks as the new sled with impunity, to date.
The buyers of the first generation of Taurus/Sable, grew up seeing cars with futuramic styling, dynamo-vision, tele-button transmissions, saf-t-glo lighting, centrifugal design, and sold as the future available today. So, the Taurus appealed to their sense of what American cars were supposed to promise.
The Taurus looked like the future, and had FWD. It was American, new in every way, and had the mechanical goods to back that up. It was a complete departure from everything else available to the mass market and a whole lot of Americans were waiting for Ford to do something else besides Brougham Iacocca-mobiles that were larger than an aircraft carrier, but only sat four comfortably.
You just described me exactly, and nailed why I bought and drove a new 1987 Sable with pride.
If Taurus/Sable had been RWD and more traditional I probably would have gone with a European car.
If the Taurus was RWD, it still would have sold well, but it wouldn’t have been the success on the market that it was. GM did this all the time, give us Moon-Landing, dust buster minivans with old 3 speed transmissions, and ancient engines. The Taurus was a complete commitment by an American auto company that many Americans wanted to see succeed.
Americans like underdogs, and in the early 1980s, Ford, Honda and Chrysler were underdogs against GM and Toyota. So, there was an environment in the market for these brands that rooted for their success.
Ford amazed everyone with the Taurus. It seemed to be a car that was completely engineered as a unit, rather than an assemblage if available parts, as was common practice for Detroit at the time. It looked modern, and FWD helped that impression. I believe that, had it been RWD, it would have been perceived as a mere styling exercise, and much less effective in the marketplace.
in a nutshell, they copied the revolutionary Audi 100, 5000 here
The 100 has a longitudinal engine, not a transverse one.
Ford did it on the cheap
They still copied the Audi and later admitted it
The Sierra, which pioneered the “jelly mould” styling at Ford, debuted before the 100.
By how many days? They’re both September 1982!
This was a fun and informative read. Thanks, Paul.
The Probe II looks much more like a Chrysler project (LeBaron, perhaps?) than a future Taurus.
Great read.
I’m still impressed, thinking back on the Tauruses I drove, especially compared with their GM A and W-body counterparts. The Taurus simply felt solid and comfortable when I drove it. It was like the tables had turned from the ’60s and ’70s when GM had the more competent road cars.
Taurus/Sable were the first US Ford models to have flush side windows. Neither Tempo/Topaz nor T-Bird/Cougar had that.
I was in Aussie when this RWD to FWD transition happened around the world Australia declined the invitation almost completely with the exception of European cars and Honda, other Japanese manufacturers kept some obsolete models in production for the Aussie market and only moved the drive wheels on the smaller models the all ‘Aussie’ brands never did make the transition and died out after everything else went the FWD route,
Done properly FWD cars are great to drive with excellent road manners, done badly they are awful, but cheaply made RWD cars arent much fun either plus theres little room inside.
Looks like someone or two had to slave through the bicentennial weekend on that ‘79 Mustang…Poor souls!
Fascinating stuff. Funny thing about Caldwell pushing the stylists is that the end result is very decent, but a bit mucky in the proportions and detailing. It looks like a clumsier Audi 100, with bits misinterpreted: the flat-lipped but low-curved rear arch when the front is lipped and full round, or the awkwardness of having a bit more car between rear door and arch, as egs (both not so on the Audi).
I’d add – not from nationalism, not a big believer in flags and such – that the EA Falcon in Aus is much nicer looking whole. Its styling was fixed by ’85 (released 18 months after Taurus) and was considered amongst the international community of stylists to be a highlight of the period. To me, it’s still a sweet looker. I should also add it was RWD and a most ordinary car, btw, needed a Petersen on the dynamics front.
3.9 ohc straight six, lightly bigger than Taurus
Commenting on an old comment here, but I have to say what a handsome car that Falcon is.
Why were our US Ford’s all fuddy-duddy and other markets got the cool stuff.
Everyone else walking around in Armani suits and we have brown Sears suits from 1978.
The OG Taurus was blah. There, I said it.
In the end the Taurus was a failure. By the early 1990’s, only rental car company purchases kept sales up. The Vulcan V6 had the performance of a 4 cylinder and the fuel economy of a V8, and Ford hardly updated it. The Taurus had various quality issues, such as transmissions and air conditioning. Ford might have been better off in the long run making the car RWD, as the platform could have been shared with Mustang and Thunderbird and Ford wouldn’t have had needed to develop MN12.
Even if that were the case (as often, Ford let the Taurus go stale as it moved on to other things), in the meantime, Taurus had the desired effect: it saved Ford Motor Company from oblivion.
“Between 1992 and 1996, the Taurus was the best-selling car nameplate in the United States, overtaken by the current title holder in 1997, the Toyota Camry…,
The Taurus was well received by both the public and the press. It won many awards, most notably being named to the 1986 Car and Driver Ten Best List and becoming the 1986 Motor Trend Car of the Year[21] Over 200,000 of the Taurus were sold during the 1986 model year and the millionth Taurus was sold during the 1989 model year…,
[1] When production ended in 1991, more than 2,000,000 first-generation Tauruses had been sold.
The second generation sold just as well as the first, becoming the best-selling car in the United States, a title it would retain for as long as this generation was sold.[11] When production ended in 1995, more than 1,400,000 second-generation cars had been sold.”
And if that’s failure, I’m betting that most manufacturers would wish for failure.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ford_Taurus