(first posted 8/5/2015) Edsel. Could there possibly be another car in all of history that is more notoriously associated with failure? Famously referred to as “the wrong car at the wrong time” in retrospect, the very full-sized Edsel debuted amidst a sharp economic downturn lasting from mid-1957 to mid-1958. In that time, new car sales in the U.S. had fallen nearly 50% compared to the levels in 1955.
The whole trigger for Edsel’s creation resulted from Ford’s desire for an additional brand to fill the price gaps in its hierarchy, with the hope of retaining more customers under the Ford umbrella as they moved up the ladder to more expensive cars. With the addition of Edsel, as well as making Continental a separate marque positioned above Lincoln, Ford would have a five brand strategy equivalent to GM and Chrysler.
Initially, the idea was to introduce a separate Mercury companion line that was priced above the existing Mercury, similar to Continental was with Lincoln. A concept car, the Mercury XM-800, was paraded around in 1954, and was reportedly ready for production as a 1956. However, the car and idea were rejected by Henry Ford II, who wanted an entirely new car created from scratch.
Development for this new experimental “E-Car” began in 1955, with four model lines planned – two based on the larger Mercury platform and two based on the smaller Ford platform. Ford claimed that its extensive marketing research enabled it to build the perfect car, with broad appeal and universal acceptance, capable of selling on its own merits and thus guaranteeing its success in the market. If only things had gone that smoothly.
You see the whole Edsel venture was flawed from the very beginning. Through all the claimed extensive market research, pre-production Edsel designs were never tested with focus groups of consumers to gauge their opinions, and even Edsel dealers did not catch a glimpse of the car they’d be selling until it arrived on their lots, wrapped in covering until Edsel’s official launch.
The fact that Ford was so overconfident Edsel would be an astounding success and had invested some $400 million into Edsel (roughly, $3.2 billion in 2015) speaks to how conceited (and clueless) Ford was with the whole program. Ford generated a significant amount of hype leading up to the Edsel’s launch, marketing is as something that was completely new and exciting. Promotional material referred to it as “never before a car like it”. Needless to say, buyers were disappointed when they arrived at dealers to find that Edsels were only heavily restyled Fords and Mercurys.
The initial MX-800 concept was conceived with the notion of slotting between Mercury and Lincoln. However, with the Edsel, Ford sought to dually target young, upwardly-mobile professionals “moving up” from both Ford and Mercury, to Mercury and Lincoln, respectively. As a result, Edsel’s pricing structure encompassed that of Mercury, with the Ranger and Pacer priced below Mercury and the Citation and Corsair priced higher. This excluded Mercury’s newly introduced flagship Park Lane that rode on a three-inch longer wheelbase and was also, rather confusingly priced into Lincoln territory.
More so, when equipped with options, Edsels and Mercurys competed directly with each other in terms of price. If Edsel was intended to provide buyers with something to step up into, why would they want to go from Ford to Edsel to Mercury, and then back to Edsel again before moving up to Lincoln? This was hardly the process buyers who cared about “keeping up with the Jones'” wanted.
Additionally, Ford’s marketing of the 1958 Edsels didn’t do much to resolve this confusion either, as promotional materials referred to the Edsel as priced from “just above the lowest to just below the highest”. One brochure compares Edsel to everything from Plymouth to Cadillac. In retrospect, the positioning strategy behind Edsel doesn’t seem so far-fetched, as in today’s world, cars from mainstream and luxury brands seem to overlap more than ever in price and features. But for 1958, this idea was just a little ahead of its time.
Rather quickly, the 1958 Edsels also earned the unfortunate reputation of poor build quality and reliability. With no dedicated assembly plant or even production line, Edsels were assembled on the very same lines as either Fords or Mercurys. Autoworkers were forced to switch to different tooling, components, and mechanics for the lower volume Edsels, which was both challenging and inconvenient.
Quality control comprised of assigning each Edsel that rolled off the assembly line a numbered score. If the average score of all cars produced during the day was of acceptable levels, then every single Edsel was sent out to dealers, regardless of how the build quality of each individual car varied. In some cases, Edsels actually left assembly plants incomplete, with missing or unassembled parts, leaving it up to dealers to complete assembly with given notes of instruction.
Of course, the Edsel’s most infamous flaw (whether or not it was actually its most detrimental flaw) was its styling. Ford’s initial market research showed that Edsel’s target market wanted a car that was easily recognizable from any angle, with a prominent hood and grille, and a jet-age inspired cockpit. At the very least, Ford delivered on those requests, but unfortunately the final product was not so welcomely embraced.
While most of the car’s styling was inoffensive enough, the chosen front fascia with its prominent “impact ring” vertical oval grille was the subject of much disdain and controversy. Combined with the horizontally oriented twin headlights, split lower grilles and bumpers, it was admittedly not the most beautiful face on a car in 1958. But that grille was, and remains to this day, the most talked about feature of the Edsel, besides its catastrophic failure of course.
While more positive comparisons referred to it as a “horsecollar”, it drew less flattering comparisons to “an Oldsmobile sucking a lemon”, or more explicitly, a distinctive part of the female anatomy – not something that Ward and June Cleaver wanted Wally and the Beaver to think of every time they pilled into the family car for a Sunday drive.
Between these and other more minor issues, such as Edsel’s confusing and trouble-prone “Teletouch” pushbutton automatic transmission (as seen on this Corsair), the Edsel failed spectacularly. Combined U.S. and Canadian sales of 1958 models totaled just 68,045 units. All things considered, this was not a bad number, but it was only a fraction of the 200,000 units Ford had projected and actually needed in order to break even on their investment.
Despite a simplified lineup and greatly toned down styling for 1959, Edsel sales dipped to just 47,396, even as the economy was improving and nearly every other automobile brand posted sales gains over 1958. For the 1960 model year, the Edsel’s product range was further trimmed to just one car line and wagon, and cleaner styling did away with the vertical oval grille completely. However, this was merely too little too late for the death-marked Edsel brand, and Ford pulled the plug in November 1959, after just 2,846 completed 1960 models had rolled off assembly lines.
The whole program was a colossal failure for Ford, costing the automaker an estimated $250-350 million in losses (represented in 1958 U.S. dollars), and given Ford’s significant investment and total confidence that it would be an incredible success, Edsel has become synonymous with the word “failure”.
In truth, apart from some build quality issues, the Edsel wasn’t a horrible car. It offered several innovations, among the most powerful V8 engines in its class, and a long list of available features. Nevertheless, it was ill-timed and most people just couldn’t get past that unusual grille. With many Edsels likely seeing the scrapyard within a decade, and low interest during their more formidable years, very few Edsels survive today.
However, this hasn’t stopped a loyal following of collectors from preserving and restoring the small percentage of Edsels left. Given their rarity, the entry costs for Edsel ownership are generally steep, even for examples in need of a full restoration. It’s nice to see that this Corsair’s owner has a lot of enthusiasm for it, although it could benefit from an interior detailing and its exterior isn’t perfect. I also can’t say I agree with all the Edsel stickers that line the dash, and certainly not with the very pickup-like rear window decal, no matter how patriotic it may be.
This gold 1958 Edsel Corsair is one of just 6,355 4-door hardtops produced, and in all honesty, the first one I can recall seeing in person in my adult life. Riding on Mercury’s 124-inch wheelbase which it shared with the costlier Citation, the Corsair was positioned as the next rung down, above the Ford-based 118-inch Pacer and Ranger series. Bermuda, Villager, and Roundup wagons rode on a shorter 116-inch wheelbase shared with other FordMoCo wagons. Total 1958 Corsair series sales (9,987) were positively correlated to its price; excluding wagons, it was the third costliest Edsel and the third best seller.
The Corsair was one of just three of Edsel’s original seven model names to survive into 1959. Now as Edsel’s sole higher-end model, the Corsair lineup was expanded to include a 2-door convertible and a 4-door sedan. Even with the additional body styles, Corsair sales fell, a result of many Edsel dealers closing shop and the public’s general lack of faith in the car.
Personally, I have always fancied myself as somewhat of an Edsel fan. The ’59 models are by far more attractive, and the 1960 models are downright beautiful. Still, there’s something about the 1958 Edsel that I find very appealing, and I have difficulty turning my eyes away from that front end. The ’58 Edsel sure isn’t pretty, but neither are bulldogs, and plenty of people like those.
I am a little late to the party, but I have always been very intrigued by the Edsel. Everyone always quote the styling and the sagging, medium price market and the poor quality control as the reasons for Edsels failure. It’s really not hat simplistic. One element that was only touched on here in the comments, was Robert McNamara. As he was making his power plays to move up to the Presidency of Ford, he drastically changed the direction of the company from when “product” men had more control.
The original plan for Edsel really did make some sense, in that Ford drastically needed to improve the medium priced sales. Unfortunately Mercury was doing poorly when compared to GM and Chrysler medium priced vehicle sales. After Ford decided that it needed to incorporate a body sharing program like GM’s A,B,C bodies, it was determined Ford should also have three bodies like GM. This included a small, medium and large body and meant another brand could be introduced at little cost. Part of the plan was to move Mercury upscale by it sharing a body with the larger Lincoln. And this is where McNamara began to mess around with the plans.
When running the Ford division, he didn’t see the point of the high priced slow selling two seat T-bird (I don’t think he understood or believed in the concept of a halo car). There were plans for a 1958 2-seat T-bird which were scrapped by McNamara, but the idea was proposed for a four seat T-bird which would cover more of the market was accepted. Earle MacPherson proposed making the T-bird a Unibody, an idea to help show that Ford wasn’t a technology laggard. Since it was decided T-birds would be produced on Lincoln’s assembly lines, this meant a last minute change for the Lincolns to become a Unibody. This then eliminated the body sharing program between an upscale Mercury and a Lincoln. This moved really eliminated Mecury moving upsacale and really destroyed the relevance of having Edsel. Further, there is some evidence that on the day the Edsel was introduced McNamara was already making rumours about “phasing” that car out. This message got out to the dealer network and eventually the public and it was fatally detrimental to the brands success.
A couple of other points that haven’t been mentioned. While the 1958 Edsel was generally considered to have poor quality (Consumer Reports gave it a horrible review), buy the 1959 MY Consumer Reports gave it a glowing review. And while I do believe Ford was way too optimistic project 200,000 sales, the Edsel actually did okay for 1958. The sales achieved in 1958 was about 5% of the medium priced car market, which was almost identical to the 1939 Mercury market penetration.
As other’s have mentioned, Thomas Bonsall’s book is really a very well researched book for the real story of the Edsel rather than the watered down version we all know.
One of Zero made: Some guy had fun making it from a Skyliner.
To me, Ford had a drought with styling from 1956 – 1962…everything they made looked 2nd rate compared to GM (’58 Tbird and ’60 Falcon excepted).
Of the Edsels, the 1959 looked the most plausible for any marketplace…a nice calm design.
I didn’t realize how rare the 1960 model was…with the attrition rate for Edsels, I spotted my first 1960 here in Houston about 10 years ago. I didn’t even realize they had produced one. FWIW, the 1960 Ford design was off-putting; the crazy Edsel tail lights are disasterous.
I can’t imagine producing 4 separate trim levels on 2 wheelbases. Makes Honda’s DX-LX-EX model line up far superior.
I find it ironic that the epitome of automotive failure, the Edsel, had models named Citation and Pacer. One moniker became a forgettable Chevrolet, the other a laughable joke for a floundering AMC. History repeats itself.
Actually, it’s a handsome car. I would drive one with pride. But the one pic above, the cream one with the dapper fellow in a suit, is so very in-your-face. It only serves to remind me of what’s missing in my life.
Why did Ford produce just over 2,000 ’60 model Edsels before pulling the plug? Wouldn’t it have been easier just to end the marque after the ’59 model, and save themselves tooling and production costs?
My guess would be the required lead-time to get a car into production prohibits just stopping. IOW, before it became apparent that the ’58 Edsel was going to be a complete flop, everything was in place to keep it going all the way up through 1960. To stop it prior to that would have meant an even ‘bigger’ loss.
Plus, there was the Edsel dealer network. Those contracts commit to keep a model going for a specific time frame. Again, for Ford to stop with the 1959 model would have meant lawsuits from the dealers (which Ford likely knew they would lose), so to honor those contracts, they had to have a 1960 model.
It’s not dissimilar to the way Studebaker went out. The company would have liked to stopped in 1964 when the South Bend plant was shuttered, but dealer contracts required them to keep supplying cars through the 1966 model year, so the Hamilton plant got to keep building Chevrolet-engined cars for the remaining two years.
Ford might have had a bit more success with the Edsel if the 1959 front end and taillights were used for the 1958 model instead of what they went with.
Someone mentioned the disharmony between the horizontal headlights and the vertical grille, and that might have had something to do with it. Imagine if the Edsel had gotten stacked vertical headlights six years prior to Pontiac making a grand entrance with that popular styling gimmick on the 1963 Grand Prix. It might not have saved the Edsel, but at least it would have looked better with the horseshoe grille.
The other day I was behind a Ford Edge SEL. How did that slip by marketing?
The figure quoted as Ford’s loss on the Edesl venture (number quoted seems to bounce around US$250-400 million at a time when a million dollars was a lot of money) has long puzzled me. The engines (the six, the Y-Block, the MEL & the FE), transmissions, suspension, platform and the rest of the drive-train came from the corporate parts-bin and were shared with other divisions and there were no new assembly plants. That leaves market research, body panels, non-shared interior parts, sales and marketing and the costs of the dealer network.
I’m probably missing something there but if the above are removed from the development program, doesn’t that take out most of the cost? A couple of the engines were of a capacity unique to the Edsel but that’s hardly an expensive exercise.
Did Ford really lose that much or were there accounting advantages in booking so many costs against the Edsel?
In the comments above, posters stated that increasing factory capacity was the major source of the loss since Edsel already shared most components with Ford and Mercury. However, this capacity was later used for the Falcon, Comet, Fairlane, and Mustang. Obviously McNamara sabotaged Edsel before it even debuted because surely the 1959 and maybe 1960 models were already designed before the 1958 model debuted. I love almost everything Ford developed between 1955 and 1980 with the exception of the 1960 full-sized Ford and the two door Maverick.
I wonder if any were raced. They raced a Tucker, why not?
Overall I think that the styling of the first Edsels was pretty good, for 1958. They look a lot like the Turnpike Cruiser. It was a mistake to try to cover the whole range of prices, they should have just stuck to one, top of the line model, that could be the bridge to Lincoln. The horse collar grille predated the formal, raised Rolls Royce style grilles that became common in the Brougham Age. In an earlier comment the photo of the Lagonda displays a similar grille design. If the grille of the Edsel omitted the smaller inner ring and had a bolder horizontal pattern shared by all three grilles, the front end would have appeared more cohesive.
That being said, once something has been seen, it cannot be unseen, or unheard. Anyone out there that is in their 60’s recalls that we once had a planet named Uranus. It was pronounced “You-ray-nus”, or perhaps “Yooor-anus” with no embarrassment or irony by the good nuns of my school. Younger readers may find this hard to believe, but the term anus was not in common use at that time. At least in my circles. The term rectum, was the preferred term, although I am aware that they do not describe exactly the same anatomical feature. The planet’s name is now pronounced Yuur-a-nus, if it is mentioned at all.
I remember that pronunciation change as well and also wondered if it was done to avoid the double entendre, but just who instigated the change and how? Also back then, Pluto was still a planet; I occasionally still hear “plutoed” used to mean demoted.
The early designs for the Edsel grille didn’t allow for enough air to reach the radiator and engine, so the opening got widened and it wound up looking more like a toilet seat than a classic prewar grille it was supposed to evoke. The other big ‘what-if’ was if Packard hadn’t failed, they were planning something that looked *very* much like an Edsel front clip for their never-produced 1957 models. Had these happened, everyone would have accused Ford/Edsel of copying Packard. The Packard Predictor show car from 1956 had that proto-Edsel look too so it’s likely the Edsel’s designers saw it.
I’d known about the late-1950s recession and all that, but this brought home for me the dip in auto purchase/spending specifically in 1957-58…..wow!
The face (front end) of the ’58 was the killer to its looks. It was not the vertical center vertical grille which bothered me, but rather it was the turn signals with their extreme side position coupled with the bug-eyed headlights that give an insulting sticking-out-the-tongue vibe to me.