(an essentially new version of an old post)
Take a close look at these two cars—there’s something deadly wrong with one of them. They’re both very similar looking Buick coupes from the mid 1980s. They’re very close in size, shape, proportions and styling, right down to a number of details. They even share the same basic V6 engine. Unless you were knowledgeable, you might very well mistake one for the other. So what’s the big deal? One of them is a low-end Buick, the Somerset Regal; the other is the 1986 Riviera, a luxury coupe that cost more than twice as much and was once an automotive legend for its distinctive styling. And here’s the kicker: the more expensive Riviera came out one year after the cheaper Somerset. Now that’s just…deadly.
Welcome to GM’s Deadly Sins, where we chronicle the corporate blunders, hubris and mediocrity that resulted in the terminal decline and bankruptcy of what was once the world’s biggest and most profitable corporation.
Please note that the cars we feature on GM’s Deadly Sins were not necessarily BAD cars per se; many served their owners well. But all of these cars failed to stem GM’s rapidly eroding market share, or more likely hastened that process. So don’t take it personally if you or your uncle owned one of them and loved it. GM’s Deadly Sins are about the decisions that created these cars, although in some cases the cars really were stinkers.
The Buick Riviera was an instant classic from the day it arrived in 1963. It stunned the world with its exceptional beauty, elegance and performance. It was a luxury coupe that conveyed class and prestige to its owners as well as to Buick and GM. Although not every subsequent Riviera lived fully up to the original, its name and reputation was solidly established. The handsome version that arrived in 1979 was the most successful of them all, and in its last year, 1985, over 65,000 of them were sold.
With its 1986 successor, GM effectively killed the Riviera, with sales plunging over 70%. And by 1988, sales were down a stunning 87%. How did GM kill off one of its finest and most beautiful cars ever? By making it look just like one of its economy cars.
How could this have happened? It makes absolutely no sense and violates all the obvious and long-established rules for automakers: make your premium products look distinctive, more exclusive and worth the extra money. And if you’re going to make a cheap car that looks a lot like the more expensive car, at least have it come out a year or two later. Amazingly, GM utterly failed to heed these rules, and in the process destroyed the image, value and sales of one of its most storied cars ever, the Buick Riviera.
I’m sure you all are familiar with the classic Riviera. It was one of the finest, if not the ultimate, post-war American luxury coupes. It and the new Corvette Sting Ray were the sensations of 1963. Its styling, overseen by GM Design VP Bill Mitchell, has been hailed as one of the best, if not the best, of the whole post war era. It simply oozed exclusivity, class and luxury, and turned heads wherever it went. I’ll never forget the first time I saw one as a kid in the fall of 1962: I was blown away; it was only a question of which one I craved more: the new Sting Ray or the Riviera. Why not both?
In 1966 the Riviera got the first of a number of restyles; in subsequent years it got bigger and more dramatic, adding a boat tail in 1971. For a few years the Riviera stumbled a bit, but it eventually got its footing back.
These large Rivieras sold reasonably well, but after the first energy crisis, Americans rightfully wanted somewhat smaller and more efficient cars. GM did just that in 1979 with these E-Bodies, with a very successful downsizing that resulted in a handsome coupe, some of the very last cars designed under Bill Mitchell’s tenure. It was now very close to its 1963 size, at 206″ overall, and substantially lighter and more efficient with FWD and an available turbocharged 3.8 liter V6.
Most importantly, it sold well, too. In 1985, in its final year some 65,000 were sold, the all-time high for the Riviera. And then, disaster struck, in the form of the new radically downsized E-Body coupes and the closely-related Cadillac Seville.
All three of GM’s former cash cows suddenly went dry, with the Riviera’s udders drying up the most. In its first year, 1986, sales were down a stunning 70%. And the drop didn’t stop; by 1988, unit sales were a mere 8,500, an 87% reduction from 1985. I challenge all of you to find a comparable or worse drop in sales in direct response to a restyle. Keep in mind that these years were during an economic growth cycle.
The 1986 Eldorado gave the Riviera a good run for the money in terms of its first year sales drop, with a 69% reduction.
The Toronado came in third, with a mere 62% drop in ’86.
This Deadly Sin wasn’t just limited to the E-Body coupes; the related 1986 Cadillac Seville, looking like a four-door Olds Calais (or worse), suffered a mere 53% drop.
All of these high-end high-profit models were mortally wounded by this shrunken-head 1986 re-design. How did this happen, to a company that literally invented the modern design studio under legendary Harley Earl in the late 1920s and was an acknowledged design leader ever since?
Blame it on GM’s insecure and controlling corporate chiefs. Harley Earl and Bill Mitchell had both been immensely powerful within the company, and usually got their way, even if it meant subterfuge or downright insubordination. The GM executive suite, under Chairman Thomas A Murphy, who had worked his way up through the finance department, was determined to have Mitchell’s replacement be less resistant to management’s will. So instead of naming Mitchell’s pick for the job, the dynamic Chuck Jordan, they chose Irv Rybicki (above), whose temperament was clearly going to make him more pliable.
Chuck Jordan, who had joined GM in 1947 and been associated with many outstanding designs, had recently spent several years at Opel reviving the brand with fresh new cars, culminating in the absolutely superb Rekord D. Jordan designed this car to prove to the Europeans that GM was capable of designing international-sized cars that were better than any of theirs. This was precisely the skill that GM desperately needed back at the Design center as they were embarking on their second wave of downsizing. But he was passed over because he was considered more likely to clash with management and stand up for his design judgment.
So the GM execs got their compliant new design VP, and the results were almost universally disastrous. The 1980s was the worst decade in GM’s history, as market share crumbled away with each new wave of look-alike shrunken-head cars.
This second wave of downsizing, in 1985 and 1986, had been initiated during the run up in fuel prices during the second energy crisis. Some economists then predicted oil prices would just keep going up indefinitely. And the federal fuel economy regulations were set to tighten their grip in the coming years. So yes, GM was faced with a daunting task, but they went overboard, convinced that their ability to finance all-new car programs would lead them back to the top of the industry. In essence, they threw out the baby with the bathwater, creating much more compact and lighter cars in the higher priced segments where buyers still expected a certain size and look, one that conveyed the status of a high-priced car. Sure, make the cars more efficient, but don’t force buyers into a little anonymous-looking pod.
The new 1985 full size C Body cars like the Cadillac DeVille were very space efficient, but their styling was just unnecessarily too truncated.
Within a couple of years, they all got longer front and rear ends to make them look visually more appealing. They should have arrived like that to start with in 1985.
The same mistake was made again with the E-body coupes in 1986, except in this case they GM went absolutely bonkers in terms of their downsizing. These cars looked positively shrunken and truncated, with hoods and trunks that were drastically short. And even worse, their styling was totally devoid of any appeal, emotion, good proportions and execution. Arguably the Riviera suffered the worst of the three; it lacked any references to its previous styling. That’s a Riviera??
At least the Eldorado maintained some stylistic continuity with its predecessor. The Riviera didn’t; and more embarrassingly, it looked extremely similar to the much cheaper Somerset Regal, which had arrived one year earlier.
GM scrambled to try to fix their obvious mistake by adding a longer front in 1988, and an available larger C pillar. That improved the front end somewhat.
Then in 1989 a longer rear end was grafted on. These helped its proportions somewhat, but these were just Band Aids on a mortal wound. At the very least, this is what the 1986 Riviera should have been in the first place. It’s not like these very short front ends and tails improved fuel economy, In fact, a longer body is generally more aerodynamic than a shorter one, and these mostly plastic end caps didn’t exactly weigh much. But this fix only went so far in masking their inherently uninspired design. Sales did turn up some, in 1989, but nothing like before, and they quickly resumed their downward trend. By 1993, only some 5,000 were sold, and there was no 1994 Riviera. The end of the road; killed by Irv Rybicki’s willingness to do management’s bidding?
Even Chuck Jordan, who was finally tapped to replace Rybicki in 1986, couldn’t turn things around by the time his much more dynamic and competitive designs hit the market after 1990. It was decided to revive the storied Riviera, and although its dramatic and some love its looks, it seemed to be overcompensating for its shrunken predecessor’s short tail. These long-tail 1995 Rivieras enjoyed a bit of a bounce in their first year, but then sales quickly shriveled away again. By 1999, only 2,000 were sold and then it was cancelled. The Riviera was now truly dead.
The GM mothership had sprung too may leaks, and the many well-meaning attempts in its final decade or two by Jordan and Bob Lutz and some other genuine car guys were doomed to failure.
The 1986 Riviera was just one of those many leaks that sunk the ship, but one of the most painful ones. Not so much in pure loss of sales and potential profits, but in the huge blow to GM’s image. The original Riviera was the ultimate representation of GM’s golden years; a superbly styled luxury coupe that held its own with the finest cars of Europe, both stylistically as well as dynamically. It was truly an aspirational car. And it’s long been a collectible classic.
This 1986 Riviera represents a company that had lost its way, unable to respond properly to a changing market. Buyers looking for a sporty-luxury coupe at the time shunned it and found plenty of attractive options elsewhere, like the handsome Continental Mark VII (above), which got a nice boost from former Riviera buyers or the delightful Acura Legend coupe, which represented the growing impact of imports in this class.
And we haven’t even gotten to the 1986 Riviera’s new all-electronic instrument panel with a touch-sensitive control center. It was typical GM at the time: clever futuristic technical gimmicks were deemed more important than getting the basic size, shape and styling of the car itself. An unfortunate preview of the future.
Note: The GM Deadly Sins are not in any specific order, chronological or by their significance. In large part it has to do when I first found and shot these cars on the street. It was finding this Riviera back in 2009 that inspired the whole GM Deadly Sin series.
Related CC reading:
On The Purpose and Nature Of GM’s Deadly Sins – And Links To All Of Them
Curbside Classic: 1966 Buick Riviera – The Ultimate Bill Mitchell-Mobile? by PN
Curbside Classic: 1986 Cadillac Eldorado – A Swing And A Miss by T. Klockau
Curbside Classic: 1989 Buick Riviera – What The 1986 Riviera Should Have Been by T. Klockau
Curbside Classic: 1986-1991 Seville – GM’s Deadly Sin #21; And To Think That I Had One (Briefly)! by PN
Curbside Classic: 1995-99 Buick Riviera – Out to Sea by W. Stopford
I remembered being amazed by the Artari video game like monocolor CRT display in a Riveria of this era at my high school’s carwash and simultaneously wondering why GM bothered to have a vastly different dash design than the strange but futuristic pod radio HVAC type interior in my elderly Aunt’s Somerset. And that Somerset was a decently fast and sharp handling car that I hooned a few times with one wheel miniburnouts with it’s surprisingly powerful and rumbly V6.
At the time, I thought at the time that Riveria was an upscale Somerset with cheesier brake lights and not an entirely different platform underneath because I tended to skip magazine articles on any non Grand National Buicks in the library. And now future me wonders why GM didn’t even bother to give such an expensive car composite style headlights like the Lincoln had.
Oh, it was worse than that: They developed a proprietary Guide Division halogen headlight that looked like sealed beams. (They were about 20 percent smaller and somewhat brighter, but you wouldn’t know that unless you did a side-by-side comparison.)
I had a chuckle when I read your “monocolor CRT” as it reminds me of how car companies today are touting their “monochromatic” car’s color, as though a single color is something special.
I had a cousin that drove a white ’86 Riviera. She likely got a good price on it since they weren’t popular. Although I didn’t know that at the time. Her dad always drove Buicks. Until he went thrifty and got an Oldsmobile 98 diesel…
A problem with 1980’s car sales was the massive inflation of late 1970s and early 1980s. Car prices suddenly tripled but wages didn’t, that effect hit hard as people started looking to replace their old cars in the early and mid 1980s. I paid $5,500 for a new special ordered ’77 Pontiac Grand Prix, later when I started looking at the smaller ’81 Grand Prix, they were $14,500 and, because of high gas prices, it was going to be hard to get another V8, everything was coming through with V6s. I didn’t bite.
That Rekord D looked great! Never heard of them before. But I don’t know if our Govt would let us have those big windows and all that glass/visibility.
Irv Rybicki and the entire GM management should have been hauled out of the GM headquarters and had their pensions revoked for allowing these monstrosities out the door. Just how stupid could these people be to allow GM to fall the way that it has? It is no different today with Mary trying to shove these over-priced electric trucks out the door. Where happened to the real car designers? It seems as if GM only employs monkeys with computers as designers. This company could do better, but chooses not to. Time to clean house at GM and the other so-called car companies.
GM’s problems run deeper than “Mary trying to shove these overpriced electric trucks out the door”.
Auto manufacturers can’t return to their past.
They must create their new glory days. Good luck to them.
Some will survive, some won’t.
I have long felt what Mr Niedermeyer stated more eloquently than I ever could that GM’s second wave of downsizing – the 1985 C/H, the 1986 E/K platforms – as well as the 1988 W and 1991 Saturn platforms were a disaster. GM didn’t suffer in the late 70s and early 80s the way Ford and Chrysler did and wasted so much money on these new platforms. Too bad GM didn’t do more platform sharing or update the first wave platforms.
Sorry, phone glitch won’t let me respond directly to comments.
Likely thousands of people bought the traditional rectangular sealed beams headlights at Pep Boys when their halogen bulbs burned out in those Guide Division composites, thinking the old type would work. I am fairly even keeled, but would have had a difficult moment and used bad words if that had been me.
In the 90s I had 4 magazine subscriptions all car and the future was very evident then. GM passed the same cars from magazine to magazine with the same motor and transmission against the top imports. You would have maybe 2 or 3 GM products with minor body changes that couldn’t compete showing how poor the American products were. That continues today with the EV movement, and as a result we are the laughing stock of the world. Then to top it off the government encourages them with their poor products.
It was insane the way GM was obsessed with going to all FWD, and shrinking their cars down to cartoon characters. For example, the Cadillac Seville, had a good design with the 80-85 version, then they just had to turn the engine transverse to gain a measly 6 inches or so of reduced length, to gain what, 1/25 additional MPG by saving maybe 30 lbs? They gained cars that were much less attractive, and a mechanics nightmare with working on these transverse engines. Such stupidity.
Troy H, Im going to defend Saturn and say they were good cars for the time. Stylish, reasonably well built, reliable and durable as the years poured on. Were they as good as a Civic or Corolla from the 90s?? No, but they were close until GM let the design rot on the vine while the Japanese were on 4 year model cycle.
Getting back on topic, GM should have used the existing chassis for the Riveria/Seville/Eldo/Toronado. It was up to date, FWD, independent rear suspension, very space efficient, could accommodate about any V8 or v6 they wanted. Spend the $$$ on refining the chassis and giving a world class port fuel injected v8 under hood.
The problem with Saturn was not the cars, at least the original S series; it was the decision to create them in the first place, as a new entity and all. The result was one of the biggest money losers for GM ever, over $10 billion in total losses (much higher in adjusted dollars). They should have just made them or a competitive subcompact and sold them as Chevys.
https://www.curbsideclassic.com/curbside-classics-american/curbside-classic-1992-saturn-sl-gms-deadly-sin-4-the-eulogy/
Buick was making great progress with turbocharging the T-type E body Riveria only to kill it right (sound familiar killing a car close to greatness GM?) before they had the Grand National’s modern computerized engine management/port injection system fully developed for the 3800. An everyday version of this motor could have been a game changer, giving good mpg along with shedding the bingo parlor image of Buick further and possibly even led to a new category of a personal luxury/GT halo type car giving a lot more bang for the buck than an eta BMW or Benz 3.8. V8 for the affluent buyer. The non T-type would have done fine with the NA V6 with it’s improved output and 4 speed automatic. All this without having wasted great sums going to a clean sheet development program for the downsized version.
From the unfinished Rivera Project:
From a marketing perspective, the 1986 Riviera was more than a foot shorter than that year’s Buick Regal coupe—whose base price of $10,654 was $9,177 less than the $19,831 that the supposedly senior coupe went for. A persistent rumor stated that Buick dealers were told not to place the Riviera too close to the similar-looking but even less expensive Somerset Regal coupe, which had been on their showroom floors since the beginning of the 1985 model year. As early as September 1985, Popular Mechanics pointedly queried, “why make an expensive car look like a cheaper model?”
As if that wasn’t enough, the Riviera’s size was also quite close to that of the LeSabre—traditionally the largest coupe in the Buick family, and now also front wheel drive. It also probably did not help that 1986 Riviera prices were up almost 16% over the 1985 version, even when accounting for inflation.
Due to these and other contributing factors, Riviera sales collapsed, declining 66% to 22,138—a painful state of affairs for General Motors, which the Riviera shared with its Eldorado (off 72%) and Toronado (down 62%) stablemates. Six years later, GM had now managed to duplicate the carnage that Ford had experienced with its 1980 downsizing. Notably, Ford Thunderbird, Lincoln Mark VII (the Continental name departed that year), and Mercury Cougar sales were all up for 1986, along with those of some of GM’s “junior” personal luxury coupes. The December 1987 issue of Special Interest Autos simply called it “the E-body disaster” and speculated that it was costing GM half a billion dollars a year in lost profits.
It seems clear that General Motors had utterly misjudged what the appeal of its new prestige coupe platform was to folks who might actually consider buying it. One can only wonder how many hundreds of thousands of future vehicle sales were lost as the revised E-body offerings for 1986 got buyers permanently out of the habit of buying big personal luxury coupes—what only one year prior had been over 181,000 high-profit sales. To add to the pain, a short but memorable star turn by a Riviera in the 1986 Arnold Schwarzenegger vehicle Raw Deal featured a sixth-generation convertible—not a seventh-generation coupe.
The last year of extraordinary sales was also due to the fact that it was announced that downsizing would take place the following year for ’86 so customers rushed to get the 1985 model. A bit like the overseas purchasing growth charts before the current tariffs took effect.
Paul, maybe I do have rose tinted glasses for Saturn. I grew up 5 miles away from Spring Hill TN in the 90s. The effect of that Saturn factory had on the area and me personally was profound
Id say 1/4 of the kids in my grade school were GM families who moved from Michigan to work at the new plant. It also kicked off some INCREDIBLE growth in the area, the population is probably 10 times what it was 40 years ago before Saturn.
Yeah it was a collosal financial blunder for GM at the time but a huge financial boom for the local area. The saturn factory is still there making suvs, middle Tennessee has become a powerhouse for automotive manufacturering because of Roger Smith’s bad strategy. Just interesting as Im sure all the $$$ and jobs GM moved south sure as hell hurt in Michigan and parts of Ohio
I can see why! 🙂
That factory could just as well have been built to turn out essentially the same car (with a bit different styling) for Chevrolet. That’s the whole gist of my argument. It didn’t need to be a whole new car company.
Wasn’t the whole point of Saturn, to reflect a different car company culture? Different and distinct, and at arms-length, from the old school disenfranchising corporate culture GM exuded, to some buyers.
It wasn’t the cars themselves that would be very different from GM cars, though they would be more carefully built. Rather it would be the car buying experience, and after sale service. That would make Saturn standout.
If GM felt their quality was approaching Japanese levels, they needed to develop a better relationship with buyers. Rationale for Saturn.
I think you are saying they needed to improve their existing brand car buying experience. Which would have been the smart/correct investment.
Such a fascinating topic. A corporation as large as GM, and assuming they’d have checks and balances. As genuinely unattractive designs get released at once, through multiple highest-level brands. Tough to market such unappealing cars, replacing a popular previous generation.
I’m almost stunned the sales and marketing people, didn’t go through the roof immediately, when they saw these mistakes.
No idea what happened behind the scenes. But did anyone try to intervene, stating the obvious. Basically: ‘These designs are a grotesque facsimile of their legacy, and the immediate cars they are replacing’.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but it seems an indictment of corporate ‘yes man’ culture.
For the sake of the corporation, did someone at some point not state: ‘These designs will help destroy our reputation’. And accelerate our decline.
I agree Paul, the Saturn should have been a replacement for the Chevy Cavalier/Pontiac Sunbird. The way Saturn was marketed and the whole idea/corporate reorganization behind it was a backhands way of GM admitting they effed up and were incompetent. Kind of made your Chevy dealer and their Cavaliers seem like a bunch of lepers.
Anyways if GM had done the right thing and just built better j cars or replaced them with the Saturn under Chevy/Pontiac names, would they have built the new Saturn factory?? Or just built the new car in Lordstown Ohio??
I largely agree with Paul here, but I have to point out that it’s possible for a smaller, cheaper model to resemble a more upmarket model without hurting sales or image. BMW and Mercedes got away with it for years. The M-B W124 came out after the smaller, cheaper W201, and looked very much like it, but didn’t suffer at all for it. Maybe GM looked at the Germans and thought they could pull off the same trick, but obviously they couldn’t.
A huge part of that is big BMWs and Mercedes of the era were really compact to midsize in US terms(circa 60-70s standards) at the most and their designers had expertise in those dimensions. GM was trying to make styling that may well have worked well on previous E body dimensions adapt to compacted proportions and the results were… this!
I think GMs design choices were overall poor in the 80s but I think there’s a 62 Dodge/Plymouth problem going on in the proportions; if the 86 Riviera(E bodies et al) remained on their 79-85 platform and it’s inherent dimensions/proportions with all the basic styling of the 86s would they be so bad? Even just as bad? The core styling was certainly not going to win over yuppies who already long since switched to the Germans(who today funny enough have every bit as bad styling/proportions as these, but I digress(I’ll save my thoughts on), but in my opinion was a missed opportunity.
GM was so hell bent on downsizing as the means to meet sky is falling fuel cost prospects of the early 80s they bet the entire farm on “smaller” being more viable than, well you know, engineering, to match or exceed the gains of “lightness”. It’s kind of funny(and heinously depressing from my POV) that present day mainstream cars/crossovers outweigh these dorky premium 80s GMs by hundreds of pounds with larger dimensions and get up do double the mileage without even a hybrid system with 100-200 more horsepower on tap in some instances.
If the 1979 Riviera sales had not increased from the previous year, I would have also called the 1977 & 1978 Riviera a ‘Deadly Sin’ as it was not remarkably different from the base LeSabre 2 door from those years. Of course, anything was an improvement over the bloated 1974-76 Rivieras with the butt-ugly rear ends.
There was a book on GM published several years ago, that I forgot the title,, but I think it written by Jerry Flint of the auto industry mag Ward’s Auto World. One revelation in the book was that there were people at Chevrolet and Pontiac that believed that every Saturn sold was one less Chevy or Pontiac. GM set Saturn up to take sales away from Honda and The other foreign automakers. The internal strife at GM probably didn’t help any.
The ‘Rino’ Riviera. A Riviera In Name Only.
The sight of these cars, nearly 40 years after their introduction, still sours my stomach. There’s nothing I can add that hasn’t already been written in these spaces on GM’s Deadly Sins. I think of Roger Smith and his arrogance leading the charge to foist these garbage designs on the car buying public, after Bill Mitchell’s exquisitely designed “E” cars of the previous generation. There obviously wasn’t anybody in a position of power at GM to yell out “stop” when these ghastly butt-ugly designs were introduced in the studio.
How could any one person be so destructive to what was at the time the world’s largest manufacturing colossus? Anything Roger Smith touched at GM turned to cow manure. It takes more than one person to carry-out the damage that was done, but Smith will occupy a special place in the annals of business and automotive history. The autos that resulted from the ’85/’86 design cycle are a partial testimony as to why we (the US) are a diminished player in the world automotive market.
I wonder if there’s a tendency among CC authors and readers alike to overestimate the influence of individual people. For better or for worse. No matter if their names are Iacocca, Smith, Lutz, or something else.
After all, decisions in the companies in question were (and are) made by a committee. Its name is the Board of Directors.
You’re mistaken. Corporate boards do not make product decisions; they hire the CEO, who reports to them. The CEO is ultimately responsible for product decisions, which are made in conjunction with those VPs and other executives that report to him. This is why CEOs get fired if the board is not happy with the product (and other decisions) that he or she made.
Corporate boards approve major investment programs and other corporate activities, and they may well be invited to review product plans, and if they have strong opinions on them it may have some influence. But they do not instigate product planning and execution. US corporate boards are the equivalent of the Supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrad) in German corporations, and is not equivalent to the Vorsdtand (Executive board/committee) whose equivalent are the CEO and his key reporting executives in the US.
Of course it’s not as perfectly simple and straightforward as that, as there are variations, and sometimes now a CEO will also be board chairman (not generally a good idea). But in any case, in historical terms, Board Chairman at GM did not have direct responsibility for product planning and decisions, with the key exception being at Ford, where HFII often meddled in that, but even then to a limited degree. And when he wasn’t happy with his CEOs, he replaced them.
I’d like to thank you for the clarification. New to me was especially that “US corporate boards are the equivalent of the Supervisory boards (Aufsichtsrad) in German corporations, and is not equivalent to the Vorsdtand (Executive board/committee) whose equivalent are the CEO and his key reporting executives in the US.”
Since I think Midsommar is German, it may be worth nothing that there is an important terminological distinction at play here: The board of directors of a U.S. corporation is more akin to the German Aufsichtsrat, supervisory board: They have an oversight responsibility, but they don’t (and legally can’t) make most operational decisions, unlike the Vorstand, management board, which has operational and managerial responsibility.
English-language publications sometimes the word “board” when referring to either the Aufsichtstrat or the Vorstand, which can give the impression that “board” is more generic than it actually is in a U.S. context. U.S. corporations sometimes DO have managerial bodies comparable to the German Vorstand, but U.S. automakers generally call these committees. For instance, Ford had the Product Planning Committee, which, as the name implies, was the ultimate arbiter of product decisions.
(I know Paul knows this well, I’m pointing it out for the benefit of others.)
Thank you, Aaron. You’ve done an excellent job of clarifying the cause of my misunderstanding.