(first posted 9/15/2016) Ominous clouds were looming on the horizon for the Independent makes as the 1957 model year got underway. The merger mania of the mid-fifties had brought some consolidation, but none of the combined players were exactly strong. ’57 would be a “make or break” year, as both American Motors Corporation (Hudson, Metropolitan, Nash, Rambler) and Studebaker-Packard would show off the “synergies” resulting from their collaboration. Always the politically correct industry cheerleader, Motor Trend took a thorough look at all the new Independent offerings in the 1957 Auto Show Issue.
The Metropolitan continued as the smallest car available in the U.S. from an American brand–though in reality the car was based on the British Austin, technically making it a captive import. Nonetheless, it was styled with Nash cues in mind, such as the enclosed front wheel cutouts and plain “inverted bathtub” proportions. For such an unusually small car, the Metropolitan sold pretty well, finding 15,317 homes, which incidentally was more that Nash, Hudson and Packard combined.
At this point, within AMC’s portfolio, Nash and Hudson were suffering badly. Though American Motors tried to update the styling, their options were limited given the unibody construction that had been a Nash trademark for decades. The most recent major restyle for Nash had been introduced in 1952, so the basic body looked wildly out-of-date by 1950s standards as the ’57 model year unfolded. AMC valiantly tried to slap on flashy trim and gaudy grilles, but the effect was a bit like dressing granny in a mini-skirt–it was trying too hard to be something it was not. Unsurprisingly, Nash only sold 3,500 of its traditional cars, a decline of 76% compared to 1956.
Since 1955, Hudson had only offered slightly revised Nash products–its own designs were dumped after the 1954 merger. For 1957, AMC stylists tried to update the looks with cosmetic detailing, but if anything the results on the Hudson Hornet were even worse than on the Nash Ambassador, with sad, stubby little fins clumsily pasted on in back. Only the most ardent Hudson fans were interested, and Hornet sales plunged 88%, to a measly 3,108 units.
Rambler was the bright spot for American Motors. Though based on an older unibody platform first introduced by Nash for 1950, the Rambler had been more effectively freshened than its larger siblings, including a thorough revamping with increased dimensions in 1956. Those bodies, available only as 4-door sedan or wagon (including pillarless hardtops for both), received minor trim freshening for 1957. At a time that most American cars were getting larger and more frivolous in their appearance, the practical Rambler was a nice alternative for buyers who wanted something more sensibly sized than the offerings from the Big Three. Buyers responded, and Rambler sales rose 89% to 87,232. The relatively efficient and logical Rambler was also very well positioned as the 1958 U.S. recession took root in late 1957.
Studebaker presented something of a dichotomy to the market. On the one hand, its Hawk series offered a unique and appealing 5-passenger 2-door hardtop “sports” car, and a new Supercharged version of Studebaker’s 289 V8 was available for Golden Hawks. The result was a well-blanced, rather unique high performance coupe. Sales for the Hawk series rose 3% to 19,674.
The rest of the line-up wasn’t so lucky. Overall Studebaker brand sales dropped 10% to 74,266. Sales for the core series sedans and wagons dropped badly: Champion -30%, Commander -21%, President -38%. A late year addition, not mentioned in Motor Trend’s Car Show Issue, was the budget-oriented Scotsman. The car was very bare bones with a $1,776 starting price ($15,210 adjusted), $1,000 ($8,564 adjusted) less than the cheapest Champion. Introduced in May, the Scotsman quickly earned 9,348 sales, helping volume though likely not helping the corporation’s bottom line.
Pity poor Packard. The once proud marque was in its final death throes, hawking horribly bastardized Studebakers–little wonder that the 1957 model year would be Packard’s second-to-last (a paltry 4,809 were sold). For car enthusiasts of this earlier era, the decline and demise of what had once been one of America’s premiere luxury brands was undoubtedly sad to behold. I think many of us can empathize: watching Cadillac crumble in more recent times has certainly been painful. No matter the decade, slapping luxury car badges on a thinly disguised plebeian product will never be a recipe for success in the high-end market.
So for a final tally: of the seven brand nameplates from the Independents that entered 1957, only five would make it out. RIP Hudson and Nash. At least some great nameplates from those brands–Ambassador and Hornet–were ultimately reused. As for the rest, AMC and its Rambler brand made a go of it for many years, struggling but surviving. Metropolitan, Packard and Studebaker wouldn’t even do that well…
The 57 Clipper sedan was a dignified response to ‘reduced circumstances’. I would enjoy owning one. It only pales in comparison to Packard’s former peers in 1957.
How is this article “politically correct” (whatever that actually means)? It’s very direct about these cars mostly being reheated leftovers, and it directly says that there was question about whether Packard would come back.
I’ll bet they didn’t compare the 56 Golden Hawk to a blackjack in the 1956 road test. 🙂
I agree that the 57 Packard was a very nicely done – Studebaker. The interiors were particularly nice. I have often wondered how the car might have done if Stude had brought it back as the 1959 President. A smaller car trimmed very luxuriously and sold at a lower price might have been a minor hit in 1959-60. But we will never know.
AMC did decent business with dressy versions of its smaller cars in this period. A Studebaker “Ambassador” probably would have earned its keep, especially since Studebaker still had the long wheelbase sedan shell in production as a commercial variant of the Lark. The Rambler Ambassador had its extra length ahead of the firewall, so it looked and rode better, but wasn’t roomier.
Hubba: You’re absolutely right, the lack of at least one full-sized 1959 Studebaker sedan, comparable to the Rambler Ambassador, dismissed anywhere from 5-10% potentially greater sales volume as that is the average percentage the 120″ wb Y-Body sedans sold from 1953-1958. Those loyal Land Cruiser/President Classic buyers upon entering a showroom in 1959 found no acceptable model to fulfill their requirements. Not everyone wanted a sporty two door coupe Hawk or a small compacted car, so suddenly they were out of luck. Likely most went over to the AMC dealer for an Ambassador or to a Big Three showroom.
Ironically, in his excellent book “Champion of the Lark: Harold Churchill and the Presidency of Studebaker-Packard 1956-1961″ by Robert R. Ebert, one of the early planning options for 1959 included a 120” wb sedan as well as the Hawk and their primary new compact car line we know as the Lark. Apparently as finances tightened, the sole full-sized sedan was a casualty. Its a shame, perhaps it wouldn’t have sold in great volume, but S-P needed every sale it could possibly muster in its last struggling years.
From a 2016 perspective it’s hard to imagine that the senior Nash/Hudsons weren’t a sought-after alternative to the ever-lower Big Three offerings…
Between the old hat styling, weakening dealer body, and rock bottom resale value, the senior Hudsons and Packards didn’t have a future.
S/P and AMC were very lucky that they weren’t able to tool up for new medium-price cars in 57 or 58. The bottom fell out for such cars in 58, and didn’t come back for about five years.
By 1955, Nash and Hudson both had the ‘stench of death’ on them. It was obvious that with the American Motors joining, both brands were seriously hurting (especially Hudson), and only the Rambler marque had any aura of ‘freshness’ about it. And those ’57 facelifts were a desperate “well, we HAVE to do something different” effort, especially in the Hudson.
Best parallel I can give today is shopping for a Mitsubishi (which has pulled itself out a bit with the Mirage), or shopping for a Suzuki three or four years ago.
I know I am a Chevy fan, but if you can look at all the offerings from all automakers for the 1957 model year, GM wins, hands down.
Even though I like the 1957 Ford featured the other day, it still falls just short of a ’57 Chevy in any trim.
The independent offerings were simply horrendous and miserably out-dated, save for one or two Studebaker models.
Even though AMC hung on for another 30 years, the others should have disappeared before they actually did.
It just goes to show how enormous a cost it was and is to be a player in the auto manufacturing game, and more nameplates may still disappear.
Yup. Plus GM’s engineering on the Tri-Five Chevies was second-to-none in the low price field. Plymouth’s 1957 torsion bars notwithstanding.
It was probably 1965, maybe even ’69, before there was another full-size Chevy that handled and stopped better than a Tri-Five.
“Plus GM’s engineering on the Tri-Five Chevies was second-to-none in the low price field” – I know I should let this one go, buuuuuuut . . .
I realize that Studebaker doesn’t get thought of in the traditional ChevyFordPlymouth discussions, but you do realize that the 2 bbl 259 of 1957 was only 5 hp shy of the output of the 2 bbl Chevy 283? The smallblock chevy was a very good performer and of decent durability, but other than having a pretty significant weight penalty, the Stude could best the Chevy on both counts, and lacked only a widespread base of installation to make it attractive as a hopp-able small V8. I also realize that by 1955-57, the Chevy was a very good all-around car and appealing to the mass market in so many ways that the Stude was not.
I totally get your point. But comparing outputs of these two engines is somewhat meaningless, as they may well have been tuned to a specific power level for various purposes, and/or the gross ratings weren’t really perfectly accurate. And these two-barrel engines hardly represent what these engines were capable of. A better point of comparison would be the ’57 283 fuel injection version that made 283 hp. The ’57 Stude 289 couldn’t really touch that, except for with a blower.
It is hard to compare the Stude V8 and the SBC because of their relative circumstances. But Ford also opted for supercharging to match Chevy FI in 1957, and Studebaker’s limited volume certainly made it impractical to offer half a dozen subtly different engine options like Chevy and Ford. An economy six, a cooking V8, and a glamorous hot rod engine is about all any company could afford with S/P’s volume.
The Stude V8 was designed for ultrahigh compression (which turned out to be a dead end compared to low compression big-inch engines), and the final carbureted Stude 289 R1 with 10:1 compression still was a match for the top 283 in the Chevelle in 1964.
Gee, Paul – we just can’t agree on anything these days. 🙂
Hubba: it’s all in the breathing (head design), and the SBC simply breathed better than the Stude and certainly the Ford Y block, with its contorted ports. The SBC breathed better than any American V8 except perhaps the old hemi. That explains why the 283 eventually made 315 hp in 1961, at 6200 rpm. No other American V8 could touch that output and rpm. Blowers don’t count. Imagine what a blown 283 could do.
Comparing 1964 Chevelle – Stude engines is irrelevant. There were many states of tune for these engines. The only thing that really determines their breathing potential is the top tune version. And the 315 hp 283, like the later 375 hp 327, were simply untouchable in their time.
The SBC was undoubtedly a great breather. It would have been nice to see what all Andy Granatelli and the Stude engineers could have done beyond what they managed by late 1963. The R series of engines used different heads which helped a lot, and the non-blown R4 was a 304.5 cid version that was rated at 280 bhp, and many felt that it actually put out 300 or more with its 2 4 bbl carbs and high compression ratio. Sadly, only one was fitted into a 1964 model car before things came crashing to a halt.
The only point behind my original comment was that I don’t think that the 55-57 Chevy’s engineering was so far ahead of everyone else’s, sound as it was. But Chevy’s execution certainly was.
A blown 283 would shatter like a cheap vase. 🙂 The Stude V8 isn’t heavier because it was made by dummies.
The SBC certainly hit a sweet spot for availability, cost, and weight. But there are many paths to the final destination, Grasshopper.
I think the other point we forget is that Chevrolet’s engineers had 4 years to look at other designs and at engineering trends and developments beyond what the engineers had at Studebaker and Chrysler. A V8 engine that hit showrooms in the latter part of 1954 should certainly have had some advantages over one that appeared in late 1950. One place where that showed up was in the Chevy block’s light weight. By the time they were deep in development, it was clear that trends had moved away from the super high octane fuels (and their need for super high compression), so engineers were able to sacrifice brute physical strength for light weight, and it worked out very well for them.
Jim; we agree more than you might think. I’d take a ’57 Stude over a ’57 Chevy any day. 🙂
A blown 283 would shatter like a cheap vase.
You do know that blown 283s were extremely common in the late 50s? Blown 283s were top performers on the drag strip, right up there with the hemis.
I know it’s popular to rag on the SBC, but the reality is that it was not intrinsically any more fragile than just about any other V8 of the times.
SBC were bored and stroked and blown to huge outputs. Here’s one punched out to 328 inches, in 1958, and, and making 430 dyno hp, with a blower.
One place where that showed up was in the Chevy block’s light weight. By the time they were deep in development, it was clear that trends had moved away from the super high octane fuels (and their need for super high compression), so engineers were able to sacrifice brute physical strength for light weight, and it worked out very well for them.
That’s not the full story; sorry. 🙂 The older design V8 like Studebaker’s had a heavy block for one reason and only one reason: they didn’t yet know how to make thin wall castings, at least not constantly and in any substantial numbers.
Ed Cole, who was at the height of his considerable engineering powers then, realized that massive, deep blocks simply were not necessary, and thin wall casting was a new technology that became available just in time for the Chevy V8, and it was a pioneer in that. All you have to do is to look at Ford’s massive and heavy Y Block, which only came out one year earlier.
And I do not accept that planned high compression had anything to do with that. It does not take a massive block to handle 12:1 or 13:1 CR, as more recent engines have shown. The SBC could easily handle those kind of CR with the right fuel, and many were jacked up to those ratios.
Massive blocks were done out of overly-conservative engineering, and the casting technology of the time. Chevy (and Pontiac) changed the paradigm, and everyone else followed, sooner or later.
If we’re talking racing use, yes, a low spec street engine will take high boost, NOS, etc for a few minutes.
The only way that the 57 GM line beats Chrysler is build quality. The 57 Chrysler line has torsion bars, great engines, Torqueflite, and styling that literally sent GM back to the drawing board.
Quite true, but it was Chrysler. They were never a real threat, especially after a short time when their cars began falling apart!
Still, I don’t think you could beat a Torqueflite then and for many years thereafter. Ditto for the slant-six. Torsion bars were cool.
The thing about Chrysler – everyone – me included – WANTS Chrysler to win, but, like Phil Mickelson, save for an occasional win, they mostly come up short.
Don’t forget that Chrysler had been No. 2 of the Big 3 from the 1930s until around 1953. Had these cars been as good as they should have been, it might very well have gotten back there. But, as we all know, things turned out differently.
You’re correct, JP. I should have qualified that statement. Mom and Dad’s 1950 Plymouth was an outstanding car they kept for 10 years, only being forced to trade it when the driver’s seat began to fall through the floor due to rust! I got a great view of the road beneath from the back seat, too.
An enjoyable (if slightly depressing) read. I had forgotten how poorly the big Nash and Hudson sold in 1957. Studebaker was a resounding success by comparison.
Although the Golden Hawk was the only really exciting product out of both of these companies, the Rambler was the only successful one.
Did the Metropolitan’s BMC engine really use metric fasteners? Or were they in fact Whitworth(less) that the reviewers assumed were metric?
That would have been Whitworth. And only Whitworth if the buyer was lucky. I’ve had Triumph motorcycles that had multiple thread standards on them (late 60’s).
When it came to thread angle and mechanical efficiency, Whitworth was supposedly the best of all the standards out there. It’s main weakness was political: Since it was the standard of England, and the British Empire, no country not in the empire was willing to use it.
Dunno Syke, I think that cuts both ways and because of British arrogance they wanted to use their own system.
Dusting off my copy of Machinery’s Handbook it’s interesting, coarse Whitworth is the same threads per inch as ANSI, but the fine Whitworth has fewer.
For Instance on a 1″ Bolt:
BSW: 8 Threads per Inch BSF: 10 TPI
UNC: 8 TPI UNF: 12 TPI
Looking at the thread profiles it is true, the Whitworth is more like a sine wave and a bit prettier than UNC/UNF thread. On the other hand, it’s probably more expensive to cut and easier to mess up when your tooling wears.
I noted this difference in my teens when I was simultaneously working on my 62 Triumph and 72 AMC:
The Triumph distributor was a lovely casting with a bronze bushing inside, separate pedestal casting with gear drive for the tachometer, really nice piece that needed adjustment, cleaning, and fixing.
AMC had a one piece die cast body that was nothing to look at, but I never needed to look at it because it did it’s job.
The most elegant solution isn’t necessarily the best one 🙂
Older Volvo’s (544, 122) with SU carbs and some Lucas parts also used SAE, metric and Whitworth. That’s why I always kept a Crescent wrench and Channel-Loks handy.
NO and by that time BMC had stopped using Whitworth threads with their different bolt head sizes, The British motorcycle industry kept using cycle threads on their products and its true on early Landrovers you can find BSW,BSF and SAE threads just to confuse the unwary by the way BSP is still in regular use and a lot of metric threads are simply imperial re interpreted as my VW nutter friend discovered when finding bolts for his van I took him to a fastener supplier who really knows his stuff.
The ’57 Packard was the Cadillac Cimarron of its day.
On what planet was “V-Line Styling” (’57 Hudson) ever considered attractive? Even “impartial sources” like Consumer Guide encyclopedias have called it “ghastly”.
At least it doesn’t turn my stomach like the Mitsubishi concept shown yesterday on TTAC. THAT looks like a facial deformity from a horror movie.
http://www.thetruthaboutcars.com/2016/09/mitsubishi-unveils-face-future-mother-love/
Sorry, all that zombie-apocalypse-horror-rotting-flesh stuff produces a visceral reaction. Always has. I wouldn’t last ten minutes as an EMT or ER doctor.
Watch millennials eat it up and ask for more for that very reason. LOL
Chas108, Paul may ding you for that link!
Actually, I somewhat rather like it. Better than some I’ve seen. Certainly no worse than some of the front ends of these ’57 cars. Seriously.
My biggest concern about that Mitsu is the very low greenhouse. I really don’t want that issue from the car world infecting the Minivan / SUV / CUV / Truck segments.
Yeesh, which lights are the lights? I thought the current Cherokee was bad.
“The ’57 Packard was the Cadillac Cimarron of its day.”
Not quite, however conceptually similar they are. Whereas Studebaker-Packard was forced to by its financially disastrous circumstances to field a redecorated Studebaker President as a Packard Clipper to meet dealer contracts and maintain the brand on the market; GM, still financially strong and Cadillac Division still with widespread market acceptance, simply cynically created the Cimarron in hopes of hood-winking the unsophisticated into buying an overpriced Cavalier in order to meet CAFE regs.
That doesnt look so bad these Mitsu SUVs are here in Mitsubishi and Peugeot flavour a friend has a PHEV model and loves it, really only the grille/Front is different squished Cadillac was my first thought.
Chas108: Don’t y’all be baggin on my V line styling. It was ahead of it’s time. I’m still waiting for it’s comeback. ;-}
Reading about these cars suddenly took me back to a VW commercial from my youth, with the Andrews Sisters (?) singing “longer, lower, wider, the ’49 Hudson is the car for you” and featuring Studebaker, Hudson and Packard. And, thanks to the wonders of the modern era, I found it on YouTube. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P2jJeEnHbtA
That was a brilliant ad. I believe it was also a ding on Buick’s “holes in the fender”?
Only goes to show, you can always look brilliant if you choose your comparisons carefully.
That ad ran in the early 1970s, if I recall correctly. One of its main points was that since VW had never succumbed to the lure of the annual model change, its vehicles would never look dated or out of style.
The irony, of course, is that by the early 1970s, VW was already under pressure from the Japanese onslaught, as its vehicles were increasingly dated, and also poorly suited to cope with American clean air and safety mandates.
By 1975 Toyota had surpassed VW as the number-one imported brand. By the early 1990s, VW came perilously close to sharing the fate of Studebaker, Hudson and Packard in the American market.
By the late 60s the US was VWs only major market, we had them but they were expensive for what you got and not particularly durable or reliable if you lived too far from a dealer, there were plenty of other four cylinder cars about with as good or better reputations and at lower price points than the increasingly out dated VW.
Not to argue with a Hillman owner, but I think Latin America was then and continued to be a huge market for VW for many more years.
I’ve always thought that the 57 Nash front-end styling would have looked better on a table radio than a car.
It’s a shame that the independents disappeared from the scene shortly afterwards. They had contributed quite a different and competing view of the contemporary automotive design. It shows that it was extremely difficult to compete with the cash rich Big Three. The independents had to keep older designs around long enough to amortize the costs, they didn’t have the volume of sales to support rapid change over. Many of the features were very good; roomy interiors, economical drivetrains, good build quality, compact exteriors. They just didn’t have the pizazz the public craved. I rather like the Packard design. It’s styling is almost contemporary, the front end looks like a ’55 Buick. It is spacious inside without the excesses of the exterior and a good performer to boot. It can’t compare to the 1955 models, and Packard was scrambling at this time trying to secure financing for a new senior car line. It is very unfortunate that Packard got the shaft in it’s merger.
Modern economics is still cut throat. Witness Samsung facing bankruptcy over the failure of it’s new cell phone. Or that Asian shipping company that has hundreds of ships sitting off shore because the company is broke and there is no money to pay to dock and unload the cargo. This will affect countless other businesses that depend on that cargo.
It’s interesting that the Rambler, which looks about as out of sync with the big three as any of these cars, actually sold pretty well in ’57 and for the next few years, especially considering it was a warmed-over ’56 Nash. Proof, along with the VW, that American had an active interest in smaller cars. Rambler’s willingness to provide a decently trimmed car, instead of a penalty box, probably helped.
Rambler was the only maker to have increased sales in the ’58 recession year, with essentially the same car. AMC got in nice boost in ’58 when their best selling car was a mid trim version of this car (the Super Line) that sold for about a 10% premium over the base trim.
I’m pretty certain that this Rambler, which debuted for the 1956 model year, was an all-new “platform” for AMC.
It had originally been scheduled to debut for the 1957 model year, but George Romney had decided to bet the farm on this car, and used whatever money AMC had left to have it debut for the 1956 model year.
Also, both Romney and James Nance were trying to get financing from the same banks for development of new vehicles. AMC got it, which probably allowed them to speed development. Studebaker-Packard was turned down.
Undoubtedly a big reason that the banks and insurance companies were willing to extend financing to AMC, but not Studebaker-Packard, was that Romney aggressively consolidated as much as he could to Kenosha, Wisconsin. The Hudson Jet and big Hudsons were simply killed, and virtually all of Hudson’s facilities were closed. He then reoriented the company around a car that offered an alternative to what the Big Three were producing.
Nance never really did much consolidating of Studebaker and Packard facilities. He was building two very different cars in two locations, and managing to lose bucket loads of money at each location. Yet he still wanted to directly challenge the Big Three with a multi-vehicle line-up.
Whatever sentiment we feel regarding both Studebaker and Packard today, it’s not hard to see why the banks and insurance companies denied Nance his request for more funds.
Plus there was the fact that Nance had zero management experience in the auto business before taking over Packard, and by 1955 it was showing. Romney had the benefit of spending time under George Mason, who had been quite good at managing an auto company.
To a large extent, the Studebaker-Packard merger was the responsibility of the Packard board and the brokerage that set up the deal much more than Nance; Nance was really looking for a Nash merger.
The Packard board bought into a very optimistic set of projections about how great things would be if Studebaker and Packard consolidated facilities and set up three all-new shared body shells (for Studebaker, Clipper, and Packard). The cost and difficulty of doing so was sort of an afterthought, although ironically, they had rejected appeals from George Mason at Nash on similar grounds. The board didn’t really share Nance and Mason’s vision for a new auto conglomerate. They just wanted a bigger-volume partner to shore up their cash flow and thought Studebaker was in better shape than Nash (which was not actually the case), having not demanded their own audit.
After the merger, it became clear Studebaker was operating in the red, so instead of shoring up Packard’s cash flow, the merger dragged Packard down. Nance couldn’t get funding for even a low-ball retooling after that. Studebaker-Packard didn’t have the resources to consolidate production except via dropping one location and resorting to a flimsy cosmetic job, which is what they eventually did. That was mostly because the Studebaker-Packard board had to basically turn over the Packard engine plant and some other stuff to Curtiss-Wright just to keep the doors open.
I’m not sure what people expect that Nance personally could or should have done in that situation. He had pushed for the board to talk to Mason about merging with Nash and the board had said no. I don’t think trying to separate Clipper was ever a good idea, but that’s the one thing latter-day pundits seem to endorse.
AMC was in a different position. For one, Nash and Hudson’s big cars were in basically the same size/price class (which was not true of Packard and Studebaker before 1957). Hudson was rapidly expiring anyway, so dumping the Step Down shell wasn’t a tough decision. Likewise the Jet, which was a money-loser from go.
I’ve said before that Rambler really benefited from being last man standing in the compact segment. The total combined market for compacts really didn’t get any bigger until the 1957 recession. It was only really big enough to be sustainable as a main line after the competition had dropped out. It was really the recession that made it enough of a bonanza to make Romney look like a visionary rather than having just made a fairly pragmatic decision about what AMC could and couldn’t afford.
To a large extent, the Studebaker-Packard merger was the responsibility of the Packard board and the brokerage that set up the deal much more than Nance; Nance was really looking for a Nash merger.
Several sources say Nance was against Mason’s proposal for a Nash/Hudson/Packard merger because Nance was not slated to be the top dog, but only the VP of the Packard division, looking up at both Mason and Romney.
In his early 70s book about Hudson, Langworth quotes Nance as saying Hugh Ferry had told him in 52 of Mason’s “grand plan”, but Mason had difficulty working with Vance and Hoffman, so it was Nance’s job to bring Studebaker to the table. Ward wrote that Hudson had put merger feelers out to Packard, as well as Nash, in the summer of 53, but Packard wasn’t interested.
The synergies claimed by the investment bankers selling the S-P merger were delusional. As with the Nash/Hudson merger, for the deal to work, production would have needed to be consolidated as both E Grand and South Bend were running below break even. Packard and Studebaker market segments were too far apart for a common platform to serve both, so S-P would have to remain a two platform company. They couldn’t consolidate at E Grand because that plant couldn’t handle Studebaker’s volume and lacked a body plant. South Bend could not build Packards unless millions were invested widening one of the lines in the body plant. Additionally, by the time the S-P merger closed in October of 54, Packard had already invested about $40M in Detroit: leasing and equipping the Conner plant, installing the V8 line and moving transmission and rear axle lines to Utica.
For the S-P merger to work, it would have had to happen in 53, before Packard invested so heavily in staying in Detroit, but it couldn’t happen in 53 because Studebaker management wasn’t desperate enough to come to the table and the Studebaker workers were not desperate enough to accept the pay cut they took in August 54. The only company being actively shopped in 53 was Hudson, which would have given Nance both the mid-market brand he wanted and the body plant which Nance wanted, before he needed it when Walter Briggs’ heirs sold out to Chrysler.
“I’m pretty certain that this Rambler, which debuted for the 1956 model year, was an all-new “platform” for AMC.”
Evidence suggest it wasn’t quite all-new but built up on the platform of the 108.5″ wb sedan and wagon introduced for 1954. Given the short lead timeframe, this expediency wouldn’t be unexpected.
That would certainly make sense, particularly given that the 108.5-inch wheelbase Ramblers had proven to be popular in 1954 and 1955, even as overall Rambler sales declined in 1954, in the middle of the Chevrolet-Ford sales war.
Perhaps I missed something, but I thought the (somewhat) special edition Rambler Rebel made its debut for 1957. IIRC, it was very quick for a 4-door sedan of its time. Can anyone out there offer more info? Thanks!
The Rebel was released in spring of 57. It had a 1st gen AMC 327 V8, instead of the usual 250. It had been intended to use Bendix EFI, but didn’t.
As hubba notes, the Rebel was a midyear offering. According to this article, the optional Rambler V-8 was the 250 cubic-inch engine.
AMC stuffed the 327 cubic-inch V-8 from the Nash into the Rambler to create the Rebel. But the Rebel wasn’t available when this article went to press.
Also, the Rebel gets a LOT more attention in retrospect than it did back when it was new. Back in the day, it really didn’t make that much of a difference. I’d love to see production figures on the model.
The sources I’ve found say that 1,500 1957 Rebels were produced.
But then about 10 years later, fall 1967, the Rambler make was dropped for AMC. It had fallen out of style in the swinging late 60’s. Then 20 years later, AMC swallowed into Chrysler.
Unfortunately for the Rambler brand that it got linked with Romney’s image as strongly as the Chrysler K-car got linked to Iococca’s. And what was essentially automotive counter-culture in 1956 (a Rambler is what you bought if you wanted something very different but had problems with the concept of buying one of those ‘furrin cars’) had turned completely stodgy and ultra-conservative ten years later.
Just like Romney. Think back to the mess that was his ’68 presidential campaign.
What would have happened to Rambler if he’d stayed put?
The Rambler American became simply the Rambler for the 1969 model year. Then in the fall of 1969 the Rambler name was dropped for the 1970 models in the U.S.
The Rambler marque continued into the 1970s in Mexico and various overseas markets.
In the summer of 77, I darn near got my frankfurter steamed in my 1967 Rebel 770 Cross Country wagon.
I did forget to mention above that I and a couple of friends really lusted for a Metropolitan back in the late 1960’s, as there were a few of them around town, whether convertible or hardtop, but too bad when we did see one for sale, it was either already clapped-out/rusted out or the price was too high.
To this day I still like them, the only one of all those independents back then, aside from the Studebaker Hawk & Golden Hawk. We REALLY liked them.
The 57 Nash looks better than the 56 did by wide margin at least, and as an early stacked headlight car it pulled it off far better than the 57 Lincoln did.
The front end was quite attractive. Unfortunately, it was chained to that fat ’51 body, and very mediocre rear end.
I still think whoever did the last Hudsons (56 and 57) knew the brand was dead car rolling and didn’t bother trying.
The 1956-’57 Hudson styling was done by Richard Arbib who was a freelance design consultant after his stint with Henney Body Company, the hearse/ambulance builder. He is credited with their ’51 Packard-Henney line and several Packard show cars including the ’52 Packard Pan American that inspired the Caribbean series.
He was also known for a dream car styling series he created for Veedol Oil advertisements, at least one of which exhibited an oversized V-theme. Indeed, the last Hudsons are just plain bizarre and ghastly. His assignment was to make the car look as different from the Nash as possible without any major body panel changes hence the tacked-on trinkets.
Wow, I had no idea that Richard Arbib did the late Hudson facelifts. He’s probably best known for designing the (now very collectible) asymmetrical late-’50s Hamilton watches which were also the first ever to be powered by a battery (which powered an otherwise mechanical movement – electronic quartz watches were still over a decade in the future). There is a definite resemblance between the ’57 Hudson and the ’57 Hamilton Ventura watch:
If we want to be technical, the Nash Rambler was not the first American compact — the four-cylinder Willys 77, introduced in 1932, was certainly a compact, and of course there was Crosley.
Good point. I suppose American Bantam would count too. They could almost even be considered “subcompacts” of the era in which they were produced.
I’ve amended the text to take out that line. Thanks!
Also the later Willys Americar. The original 1939 Studebaker Champion was kind of a compact.
And before the Willys there was the Model A, Model T, and quite a few others… 🙂
True — I was looking at it specifically in the sense of “models that were notably smaller than likely rivals of the same period and thus likely to be perceived by buyers as compact.”
How would the Packard nameplate work today, reasonably assuming young people don’t remember the original? Of course it would be of modern design, manufacture etc.
Does the Metro qualify as the first captive import?
The ’57 Packard turned out to be a beauty. Knew someone who owned one that I saw nearly every day on my way to Jr. High School. If only they could have sold it as a smaller sized fine car. By 1959 the Big 3 medium and high end cars had gotten outrageously large and Packard might have had a chance with the 120″ or even the 113″ chassis. The 1958 models lack of new front fenders and general cobbled up look really killed things for them.